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This essay argues that the ongoing U.S.-driven “Global War on Terror” stands apart 
from similar state campaigns in its special focus on confronting “foreign fighters” – 
armed transnational non-state Islamists operating outside their home countries – in 
places where the U.S. is no less foreign.  This global hunt for foreign fighters animates 
diverse attempts to exclude similarly “out of place” Muslim migrants and travelers from 
legal protection by reshaping laws and policies on interrogation, detention, immigration, 
and citizenship.  Yet at the same time, certain other outsiders – namely the U.S. and its 
allies – enjoy various forms of exemption from local legal accountability.  This essay 
illustrates this braided logic of exclusion and exemption by juxtaposing the problems of 
extraordinary rendition and military contractor impunity in both post-war Bosnia-
Herzegovina and post-invasion Iraq.  This framework – which predates and will likely 
outlast the Bush administration – undermines the rule of law and state-building efforts 
and occludes crucial questions surrounding the legitimacy of how U.S. global power is 
exercised.  This essay employs treaties, Bosnian, Iraqi, and U.S. statutes, cases, and 
regulations to reframe post-Cold War debates about nation-building and post-9/11 
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A specter continues to haunt America after eight years of war – the specter of a universal 
enemy, purported foe not only of the United States but of humanity as such.  Many 
epithets are employed to describe al-Qa‘ida and other armed transnational non-state 
Islamist groups that occupy the place of the universal enemy: terrorist, extremist, jihadist.  
But the term “foreign fighter” is particularly useful in analyzing the underlying, 
distinguishing, and persistent logic at work behind diverse U.S.-driven legal and policy 
interventions worldwide.  From Bosnia-Herzegovina to Somalia to the Philippines, to say 
nothing of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. and its allies have repeatedly invoked the need 
to separate foreign Muslim fighters – typically portrayed as Arab, rootless, fanatical, and 
brutal – from local Muslims, whose potential for moderation must be nourished 
whenever possible.  With the universal enemy often glossed as “foreign,” it is little 
surprise that these campaigns’ most notorious institutional practices – such as 
extraordinary renditions, “black site” prisons, and of course, Guantánamo – have 
overwhelmingly targeted Muslims who are outside of their home countries. 
 Many have remarked at how the purportedly unique threat of terrorism from 
groups such as al-Qa‘ida has justified any number of extraordinary measures, including 
human rights abuses and impunity for them.  This essay, however, focuses on a key slice 
of this picture in order to sharpen the terms of analysis and to inform the ongoing 
mapping of still-shadowy transnational U.S. detention practices.  I argue that the 
extraordinary threat allegedly posed by the figure of the foreign fighter – a special 
category of “terrorist” – has occasioned a diverse set of laws and policies specifically 
targeting transnational Muslim populations in various countries.  At the same time, there 
are measures that effectively immunize other foreigners – often Americans and their 
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allies – from local legal accountability in those same countries.  Both of these types of 
arrangements can readily coexist because of a deeper assumption that the U.S. – as the 
one state that most convincingly speaks from the position of the universal – can make 
decisions on behalf of others as to how different outsiders should be treated. 
 This essay thus presents three contentions.  First, the under-theorized category of 
the foreign fighter is key to understanding the logic of the amorphous campaign against 
transnational armed non-state Islamist groups that was until recently called the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT)1, a term I will retain for the sake of simplicity.  More so than 
repression at home or conquest abroad, it is the various U.S.-led efforts aimed at foreign 
fighters in multiple places where the U.S. is itself no less foreign that distinguishes 
GWOT from other states’ struggles with “terrorism.”  This logic predated the 
administration of George W. Bush and will in all likelihood outlast it. 
 Second, the glossing of armed transnational non-state Islamist groups as “foreign” 
then leads to broader efforts to police transnational Muslim mobility, or “Muslims out of 
place.”  Just as ordinary counterinsurgency involves monitoring and managing the entire 
local population in order to isolate the enemy hiding within it, a globalized 
counterinsurgency targeting border-crossing individuals sets its sights upon populations 
that are transnational in nature.  The effect has been a targeting of out-of-place Muslims 
                                                 
1 A widely-circulated media report indicated that the administration of U.S. president Barack Obama had 
replaced the term “Global War on Terror” with “Overseas contingency operation.”  Scott Wilson & Al 
Kamen, “Global War on Terror” Is Given New Name; Bush’s Phrase is Out, Pentagon Says, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 25, 2009, at A4. Notwithstanding any possible shifts in rhetorical style, this appears to be largely a 
nonevent.  GWOT was never a single government program, but rather always a loose assemblage of 
military and non-military initiatives, including various “overseas contingency operations” (a term that long 
predates the Obama administration) such as Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan.  See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2003 OBLIGATIONS ARE 
SUBSTANTIAL, BUT MAY RESULT IN LESS OBLIGATIONS THAN EXPECTED 4 (2003) (featuring world map of 
“Fiscal Year 2003 Contingency Operations”).  The activities that fell under the general umbrella of GWOT 
appear to be largely unaffected by any nomenclature change that may have taken place. 
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for exclusion from local legal protection in various countries using a variety of tools, of 
which Guantánamo and extraordinary rendition are only the best known.  Moreover, the 
exclusion of out-of-place Muslims from legal protection often coexists in tension with the 
exemption of other outsiders (often westerners) from local legal accountability in the 
same places.  By juxtaposing two recurring problems of the post-9/11 legal landscape – 
military contractor impunity and extraordinary rendition – we see a state of affairs in 
which some outsiders can commit crimes without facing trial, while others may be 
kidnapped and expelled without ever being charged in the first place.  GWOT is 
distinctive insofar as the hunt for foreign fighters in other people’s countries encourages 
and relies on both of these logics of exclusion and exemption, thus braiding them 
together. 
 This leads to the third contention, namely that this braided logic of exemption and 
exclusion seems natural – the U.S. can readily label these adversaries “foreign” as if it 
were not – because the U.S. claims to speak from the position of the universal.  Unlike a 
sovereign that merely exercises its prerogative against rebels in his own territory, the U.S. 
also claims to fight in the name of supporting other sovereigns, protecting the order of 
nation-states against groups seen to be threatening it.  When the U.S. declares foreign 
fighters to be enemies of mankind, it is making a political decision concerning not only 
its own differences with others, but the differences between others as well.  It is this 
ability to arbitrate between differences – more than any specific substantive content – that 
defines what I mean by “universal.”  Thus, foreign fighters are a universal enemy not 
because they may or may not have enmity towards humanity, but because they have been 
declared enemies by those who occupy the position of the universal. 
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 The structural logic sketched by this paper – namely, the policing of transnational 
Muslim populations, with its concomitant placement of some people outside the law and 
others above it – has had far-reaching and disturbing consequences.  First and most 
obvious has been the corrosive effect on the rule of law due to impunity for abuses 
committed by the U.S. and its allies, both against locals and foreigners.  Second, this 
braided logic ultimately subordinates some national sovereignties to U.S. global 
imperatives in a manner that undermines the very state-building projects that the U.S. and 
its allies ostensibly seek to sponsor.  And third, the implicit distinction between universal 
and foreign occludes crucial normative questions about how to assess the legitimacy of 
political interventions across communities – western, Islamic, and otherwise – and the 
meanings of solidarity. 
 In order to demonstrate this structural logic, I use post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and post-invasion Iraq as case studies, analyzing the transnational interplay between 
treaties, statutes, court cases, and regulations in each.  At first glance, these two situations 
would seem to have little in common.  In terms of historical moments, one is a 
paradigmatic case of post-Cold War humanitarian intervention, the other is commonly 
cited as exemplifying the challenges (or errors) of the post-9/11 era.  In terms of political 
contexts, one is a post-conflict situation ruled largely through a multilateral Euro-
American effort, the other a very active conflict managed mostly by the United States.  In 
terms of legal backdrops, one is a sui generis constitutional protectorate, the other a 




 Yet in both cases, a concern over foreign fighters has prompted various measures 
by the U.S. and its allies to deal with out-of-place Muslims.  Although the tools – 
including bilateral and multilateral treaties, nationality and immigration statutes, and the 
laws of war – seem to vary widely on the surface, there is a common logic at work: to 
push out-of-place Muslims – even naturalized citizens in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
– outside legal protection even while elevating western soldiers, contractors, and 
bureaucrats above legal accountability. 
 This essay proceeds in three parts: In Part I, I sketch the structural logic that sets 
GWOT apart from other state-led campaigns against “terrorism” by introducing the 
category of the foreign fighter, providing some background on the policing of out-of-
place Muslims, and analyzing the universal-foreign distinction.  In Parts II and III, I use 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq, respectively, to demonstrate how the concern over foreign 
fighters plays out in a braided logic of exemption and exclusion in vastly different 
contexts using different legal tools.  Finally, the conclusion considers some of the 
consequences of this structural logic and presents some of the crucial questions it has 
occluded. 
 
I. FOREIGN FIGHTER, MUSLIM OUT OF PLACE, UNIVERSAL ENEMY: THE ENDURING LOGIC 
OF THE “GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR” 
This section of the essay sketches the broad outlines of a central, distinguishing, and 
enduring logic of the U.S.-led campaign against armed transnational non-state Islamist 
groups, in three parts.  First, it introduces the figure of the “foreign fighter” as a 
purportedly unique threat and explains its utility in elucidating what makes the Global 
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War on Terror distinct from other states’ struggles with “terrorism,” even in the post-
Bush era.  Second, it describes how concerns over transnational non-state armed Islamist 
groups emerged in the 1990s, leading to early U.S. efforts to police “out-of-place 
Muslims.”  Third, it shows how the resulting braided logic of exclusion and exemption 
relies on an implicit distinction between two rhetorical positions – universal and foreign – 
on how to deal with difference. 
 Before proceeding, however, three caveats are in order.  First, this is an essay 
about how the U.S. and its allies have understood and sought to deal with a particular 
empirical reality, namely the existence of non-state transnational armed Islamist groups.  
It is not about the groups themselves or their normative claims.  Such an analysis, 
however otherwise salutary or needed, would shed little additional light on the policies 
examined here precisely because those policies tend to conflate a staggeringly diverse 
array of Muslims – not merely the political and apolitical, violent and nonviolent, but 
violent groups with distinct or even conflicting agendas – on the basis of their 
“foreignness.” 
 Second, and for similar reasons, analyzing the complex relationships between 
diverse transnational Muslim populations and their local counterparts is also beyond the 
scope of this paper.  These relationships, fraught with expressions of mutual admiration 
and solidarity as well as rancor and even racism, must be rigorously evaluated and 
compared in their own specific contexts.  But by treating such relationships as part of a 
common problem in a globalized counterinsurgency, the U.S. has added an entirely new 
dimension to them – it is that dimension that is the immediate concern of this paper, 
however relevant local dynamics may be. 
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 Third, this essay focuses specifically on laws and policies towards “out of place” 
Muslims in sites of intervention outside the west, often made or heavily influenced by the 
U.S. in the name of other sovereigns.2  It is not about Muslims living in the west, or those 
outside the west who remain in their own countries, even though the former are often 
treated very much as “out of place”3 and both of these categories together comprise the 
vast majority of victims of GWOT-driven policies worldwide.  This essay seeks to 
complement, rather than downplay, the voluminous extant literatures on such groups.  It 
hardly bears repeating that GWOT is not a single policy or program, but rather a series of 
distinct, interconnecting, and mutually reinforcing logics.  The well-told story of how 
interrogation policies originally devised to break out-of-place Muslim detainees in 
Guantánamo – classified as “unlawful enemy combatants” without legal protections – 
                                                 
2 Muslim citizens of western states traveling in zones of intervention do not fit neatly within the categories 
delineated in this paper, although their legal status has enabled them to play a central role in engendering 
litigation, diplomatic efforts, and political pressure surrounding GWOT.  Only one western citizen, 
Canadian Omar Khadr, remains detained at Guantánamo and U.S. citizen petitioners have unsurprisingly 
been overrepresented amongst GWOT-related detainees whose cases have been heard by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (U.S. citizen detained in Afghanistan); 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (U.S. citizen detained as criminal suspect inside the U.S., then 
designated as “unlawful enemy combatant”); Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008) (U.S. citizens 
detained by U.S. forces in Iraq).  Such individuals’ experiences, however, are in many ways dissimilar from 
the bulk of Muslims travelers outside the west who, lacking the relative protection of western passports, 
form the focus of this paper. 
3 In this respect, this paper stands apart from the extensive work on Muslim minorities in the west (whether 
seen as autochthonous or diasporic), often organized under headings such as multiculturalism, minority 
rights, or integration.  See, e.g., JOCELYNE CESARI, WHEN ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY MEET: MUSLIMS IN 
EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE WEST: VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE 
(Yvonne Haddad & Jane Smith eds., 2002).  An equally rich counterpart discourse in South Asia (and areas 
that experienced colonial administration through British India, such as Malaysia and Singapore) tends to 
treat the question of Muslims in terms of nationalism or “communalism.”  See, e.g., ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY, 
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND CIVIC LIFE: HINDUS AND MUSLIMS IN INDIA (2003); Ayesha Jalal, “Exploding 
Communalism: the Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia,” in NATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 76 (Sugata Bose & Ayesha Jalal eds., 1997).  Both contexts raise questions about the 
history and nature of “secularism” and its relationship to state power.  See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS 
OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY (2003). 
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migrated to Abu Ghraib, whose inmates’ legal status was never in doubt, is but one 
particularly vivid reminder of this fact.4 
 
A. The Foreign Fighter as Figure of Threat 
The figure of the “foreign fighter” has featured prominently in rhetoric and public 
discussion about GWOT, standing for the most fanatical and dangerous type of enemy.  It 
is frequently claimed that they make up the bulk of suicide attackers; that they have less 
regard for the welfare of civilians than even locally-bred rebels; and that ultimately they 
are beyond the realm of political legitimacy.  George W. Bush was among those who 
described the phenomenon most vividly: “the violence you see in Iraq is being carried out 
by ruthless killers who are converging on Iraq to fight the advance of peace and freedom . 
. . from Saudi Arabia and Syria, Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Libya and others.”5  Bush 
repeatedly invoked the need to: 
[P]ursue the terrorists and foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere.  See, 
you can’t talk sense to these people.  You cannot negotiate with them.  You cannot hope 
for the best.  We must engage these enemies around the world so we do not have to face 
them here at home.6 
 
                                                 
4 The genesis of the structural conditions for such abuses has been widely located in the subordination of 
prison management to interrogation imperatives, despite longstanding military doctrine mandating a strict 
separation between the two functions.  This process began upon the recommendation of Maj. Gen. 
Geoffrey Miller, commander of the Guantánamo facility, after a September 2003 visit to U.S. detention 
centers in Iraq.  See Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations 
in Iraq (Sept. 9, 2003) (“[I]t is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions 
for successful exploitation of the internees.”).  See also Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military 
Police Brigade 8-9 (2004) [hereinafter Taguba Report]; AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention 
Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 10, 24-25 (2004).  Subsequent investigations have revealed 
how specific interrogation techniques “migrated” to Iraq from Guantánamo via Afghanistan even earlier, in 
the summer of 2003.  See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE 
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY at xxii-xxiv, 157-88 (Comm. Print 2008). 
5 President George W. Bush, Remarks at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (June 28, 2005). 
6 President George W. Bush, Remarks at Pensacola, Florida (Aug. 10, 2004).  This line was part of Bush’s 
stump speech during the 2004 campaign.  See also, e.g., Remarks at Phoenix, Arizona (Aug. 11, 2004); 
Remarks at Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin (Aug. 18, 2004). 
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This perception of foreign fighters has been by no means confined to the foreign policy 
thinking of the Bush administration.  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has also declared 
that “members of the Taliban who are not hard-core extremists . . . shouldn’t be allied 
with foreign fighters and foreign interests who do not have the best interest of 
Afghanistan at heart – they’re merely using Afghanistan for other purposes.”7   
 A simple Google search of the term “foreign fighters” calls forth thousands of 
items about Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Somalia, and other fronts in the struggle 
against the perceived global Islamist threat.  The foreign fighter represents a globetrotting 
fusion of intolerant piety, political violence, patriarchy, hatred of “the west,” and sheer 
ruthlessness.  The following snippets (and many of the headlines under which they run) 
typify this portrayal: “The foreign fighters . . . are more violent, uncontrollable and 
extreme than even their locally bred allies.”8  “The foreign mujahideen . . . imposed strict 
Islamic codes of behavior on the neighborhood.  They harassed Iraqis who smoked 
cigarettes or drank water using their left hand, which is considered impure.  They banned 
alcohol, Western films, makeup, hairdressers, ‘behaving like women’ – i.e., 
homosexuality – and even dominoes in the coffeehouses.”9  More lurid: “Screaming 
‘Allahu Akbar’ to the end, the foreign fighters . . . proved to be everything their 
reputation had suggested: fierce, determined and lethal to the last.”10  While there is 
debate over the degree of influence foreign fighters have had in anti-U.S. insurgencies 
                                                 
7 Radio interview by Radio Free Afghanistan with Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State (Apr. 6, 2009). 
8 David Rohde, Foreign Fighters of Harsher Bent Bolster Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at A1. 
9 Nir Rosen, Home Rule: A Dangerous Excursion into the Heart of the Sunni Opposition, THE NEW 
YORKER, July 5, 2004, at 48.  
10 Ellen Knickerbocker, “They Came Here to Die”: Insurgents Hiding Under House in Western Iraq Prove 
Fierce in Hours-Long Fight with Marines, WASH. POST, May 11, 2005, at A1. 
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over time,11 there is a widespread view that they are politically and religiously more 
“hard-core” than local Muslims. 
 Unlike more commonly-used terms such as “terrorist,” “extremist,” or even 
“jihadist,” the category of foreign fighter provides a relatively recognizable means for 
sorting, at least on a relative basis, “good” Muslims from “bad” Muslims12: travel.  The 
idea of the foreign fighter has a practical dimension: the notion that enemies who cross 
borders are more ambitious, more skilled, more elusive, and hence more dangerous.  It 
also has a normative one: enemies who cross borders are illegitimate insofar as they have 
not been authorized by any sort of recognizable democratic mechanism, either at home or 
in the areas they visit.  As mentioned above, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
evaluate these empirical or normative assumptions; I simply wish to note here, that they 
remain assumptions, having rarely been subjected to serious scrutiny, or weighed against 
countervailing arguments.13 
                                                 
11 One widely-cited study notes that “the insurgency [in Iraq] is largely homegrown” but that foreign 
fighters play a “large a role in the most violent bombings and in the efforts to provoke a major and intense 
civil war . . . [and] give Bin Laden and other neo-Salafi extremist movements publicity and credibility.”  
ANTHONY CORDESMAN & NAWAF OBEID, SAUDI MILITANTS IN IRAQ: ASSESSMENT AND KINGDOM’S 
RESPONSE 6 (Center for Strategic & International Studies 2005).  Moreover, “many are likely to survive 
and be the source of violence and extremism in other countries.”  Id. 
12 Labeling of Muslims as either “good” or “bad” ultimately reflects not cultural or religious differences, 
but a political choice assigning “quasi-official names for those who support and oppose American 
policies.”  MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE COLD WAR, AND THE 
ROOTS OF TERROR 260 (2004).  One of the common critiques of GWOT, namely that it propagates a 
misleading stereotype of a monolithic Islam, is inadequate here, as the logic of protecting good local 
Muslims against bad foreign ones recognizes and indeed appropriates the diversity existing within Islam.  
See, e.g., Sayres Rudy, Pros and Cons: Americanism Against Islamism in the “War on Terror,” 97 THE 
MUSLIM WORLD 1, 33 (2007). 
13 The dearth of peer-reviewed scholarship on so-called “foreign fighters” is unsurprising, given the 
obvious data collection problems.  Both the academic and policy literatures have focused primarily on 
identifying national origins, motivating factors, and organizational structures for foreign fighters without 
examining the presupposition that they are either more dangerous or less legitimate than local insurgents (to 
say nothing of U.S. forces).  See, e.g., Reuven Paz, Arab Volunteers Killed in Iraq: An Analysis, 3 PRISM 
SERIES OF GLOBAL JIHAD 1 (2005); ALAN KRUEGER, WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST?: ECONOMICS AND THE 
ROOTS OF TERRORISM 83-103 (2007); JOSEPH FELTER & BRIAN FISHMAN, AL-QA’IDA’S FOREIGN FIGHTERS 
IN IRAQ: A FIRST LOOK AT THE SINJAR RECORDS (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 2007). 
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 Foreign fighters are presented as a unique kind of adversary insofar as they are 
both non-local but also non-state in nature, a hybrid between a rebel and an invader with 
no fixed source of accountability.  The political thinker Carl Schmitt foresaw such a 
scenario when he warned that an armed non-state actor without an essentially localized 
and defensive character “becomes a manipulated cog in the wheel of world-revolutionary 
aggression.  He is simply sent to slaughter, and betrayed of everything he was fighting 
for, everything the telluric character, the source of his legitimacy as an irregular partisan, 
was rooted in.”14  Whereas an ordinary rebel challenges an individual state’s monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force in its own territory, such non-state transnational actors are 
challenging the exclusive prerogative of states as a category to wage war across 
borders.15  The U.S. has effectively argued that al-Qa‘ida represents just such a challenge 
to the state system16 and that therefore all states – not merely the U.S. and its allies – 
have an interest in defeating it.17 
                                                 
14 CARL SCHMITT, THE THEORY OF THE PARTISAN 52 (A.C. Goodson trans., 2004) (1963).  Schmitt’s 
primary concern with such mobile (“motorized”) partisans, aside from the danger of their abstractly 
undefined enmity, would be their manipulation by external state sponsors.  He did not seem to envision the 
possibility that they would go so far as to wage war while rejecting the goal of membership in the state 
system altogether.  Id. at 53 (“In the longer view of things the irregular must legitimize itself through the 
regular, and for this only two possibilities stand open: recognition by an existing regular, or establishment 
of a new regularity by its own force.”). 
15 See, e.g., Joseph Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, 
and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 34 (2004) (“International Law Reserves 
Solely to States the Authority to Engage in International Armed Conflict.”); MOHAMED-MAHMOUD 
MOHAMEDOU, NON-LINEARITY OF ENGAGEMENT: TRANSNATIONAL ARMED GROUPS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AL-QAEDA AND THE UNITED STATES 7 (Harvard University Program on 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 2005) (“Al Qaeda is a sub-state, international armed group that 
is making a claim to a legitimate war against a group of countries”). 
16 Transnational non-state armed groups do not necessarily challenge the state system as such, especially if 
they subordinate themselves to national governments or movements, as arguably occurred with most 
foreign Muslim fighters in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the International Brigades during the Spanish 
Civil War.  For more on the narrowing scope for transnational warfare by non-state actors in the nineteenth 
century, see JANICE THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES AND SOVEREIGNS 69-106 (1996). 
17 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (Declaring the 9/11 attacks a “threat to 
international peace and security” and invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter to impose obligations on all 
states to take actions against financing of terrorism). 
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 It is not uncommon, of course, for states to portray their adversaries as somehow 
foreign and therefore less legitimate; nor is it strange for them to argue that their enemies 
are also the enemies of mankind.  What makes GWOT different, however, is the unusual, 
if not unique, ability of the United States to actually put such a vision into practice 
through policies specifically targeting Muslims outside their home countries.  Over two-
thirds of detainees sent to Guantánamo were captured in Afghanistan or Pakistan18, 
outside of their own countries, in part due to criteria promulgated by Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld that called for the transfer to Guantánamo of “non-Afghan 
Taliban personnel.”19  According to one former military intelligence soldier serving in 
Afghanistan, the result was that “every Arab we encountered was in for a long-term stay 
and an eventual trip to Cuba.”20  Across the border, former Pakistani President Pervez 
Musharraf boasted that Pakistan handed over 369 detainees, presumably foreigners, to the 
                                                 
18 Of the 517 Guantánamo detainees known to have been processed by Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs), 66% were captured in Pakistan or by Pakistani authorities.  See MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA 
DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 14 (2006), 
http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf.  There are no known cases of Pakistani 
citizens being sent directly from Pakistan to Guantánamo, although three Pakistani “high-value detainees” 
– including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – were captured in Pakistan and subsequently transferred to CIA 
“black sites.”  See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF 
FOURTEEN “HIGH VALUE DETAINEES” IN CIA CUSTODY 5 (2007). 
19 Information Paper from Maj. Jeff Bovarnick, Legal Advisor, Bagram Collection Point, on SECDEF 
Detention Criteria ¶ 3(c) (Apr. 20, 2003), available at http://file.sunshinepress.org:54445/secdef-detention-
criteria.pdf (citing Modification 1 of SECDEF Implementing Guideline on Detainee Screening and 
Processing for Transfers of Detainees in Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Jan. 9, 2003).  The 
directive further defines “non-Afghan Taliban” as “foreign fighters for the former regime.”  Id. ¶ 4(d). 
 Guantánamo also represents an important exception to the logic of pursuing out-of-place Muslims 
insofar as some two hundred local, Afghan, Muslims were also sent there.  At no time before or since in the 
course of GWOT has the U.S. been known to have removed individuals from their own countries for 
detention elsewhere in such numbers.  This aberration is likely explained by the unusual unavailability of a 
pre-existing strong state apparatus upon which the U.S. could rely, with the requisite ability to control local 
populations. 




U.S., with individuals there “earn[ing] bounties totaling millions of dollars.”21  Many 
detainees at Guantánamo captured in both countries have claimed that they were sold for 
bounties essentially because they were foreign Muslims.  “When [Taliban opponents] 
capture an Arab,” explained Tunisian Hisham Sliti to a panel of military officers, “they 
either sold him or stole his belongings and killed him.”22  Similarly, virtually every 
individual known to have been detained as part of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition and 
“black site” detention programs was captured either outside of their country of origin or 
had dual nationality or analogous status.  As late as 2007, U.S. authorities were covertly 
coordinating the detention and rendition of some one hundred foreign Muslims in Kenya 
who had fled the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia.23 
 
B. Muslims Out of Place as Target Population 
The post-9/11 worldwide hunt for Muslim foreign fighters – and the related slippage 
between this category and traveling Muslims in general – did not spring from a vacuum.  
The contours of this structural logic had been developing for nearly a decade, from the 
early years after the Cold War, as the U.S. and its allies repeatedly encountered – and 
conflated – diverse transnational movements operating under the banner of Islam.  Some 
of these movements were violent, some not; some saw themselves as enemies of the U.S., 
                                                 
21 PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: A MEMOIR 237 (2006).  The reference to bounties was 
subsequently excised from the Urdu edition of the book.  See PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, SAB SE PAHLE 
PAKISTAN [PAKISTAN ABOVE ALL] 297 (2006). 
22 Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings for ISN 174 at 11 (2006).  See also, e.g., CSRT 
Transcript for ISN 672 at 6 (Detainee describing his captors as “talking about the Americans being willing 
to buy everybody who was a stranger in that country.”); CSRT Summarized Detainee Testimony for ISN 
719 at 1 (“Any Arabs in Pakistan were being arrested at that time.”); MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 20, at 
334-35 (“. . . Indonesian intelligence agents were said to be collecting U.S. bounties for any Arab they 
turned in.”). 
23 See, for example, HORN OF AFRICA: UNLAWFUL TRANSFERS IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” (Amnesty 
International 2007); HORN OF TERROR: REPORT OF U.S.-LED MASS EXTRA-ORDINARY RENDITIONS FROM 
KENYA TO SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA AND GUANTANAMO BAY, JANUARY-JUNE 2007 at 30-31 (Muslim Human 
Rights Forum, 2007). 
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some as critics, others as potential allies.  The most common narrative – that thousands of 
Arab fighters who fought in the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) subsequently evolved 
into al-Qa‘ida – threatens to collapse our historical understanding to a narrow chronology 
of covert wars and intelligence activities, or even more wrongly as a teleological prelude 
to the 9/11 attacks.  Instead, it would be useful to frame U.S. encounters with 
transnational Islamist movements in the post-Cold War years in terms of two kinds of 
political crises: a crisis of legitimacy in U.S.-backed client states in the Middle East, and 
a crisis of legitimacy within the U.S.-dominated UN system. 
 First, crises of legitimacy within American-backed authoritarian regimes in the 
Middle East (especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia) manifested themselves in particularly 
violent struggles between states and armed opposition groups that spilled beyond those 
countries’ borders.  Most important was the war in the 1990s between Egypt, a key U.S. 
client state, and the armed dissident groups al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad al-Islami.  
After these groups were blamed for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, 
the U.S. was more than willing to assist the Egyptian state in hunting down dissidents 
abroad.  The overseas war soon intensified, with the June 1995 assassination attempt on 
president Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia and the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in 
Islamabad in November of that year.  In parallel, U.S. client states also participated in 
rounding up and at times expelling foreigners, especially Arabs, on their soil, as occurred 
in Pakistan after the Egyptian embassy attack.24  And in concert with local intelligence 
agencies, the CIA orchestrated kidnappings of Egyptian dissidents in Croatia and Albania 
in 1995 and 1998 respectively (and perhaps elsewhere as well), arranging for their 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., “Pakistanis Probe Arabs on Bomb Blast,” UNITED PRESS INT’L, Nov. 21, 1995 (describing 
seizures of dozens of Arabs and other foreign Muslims at major Pakistani airports and Lahore railway 
station, as well as raids on Arab and Afghan NGO offices in Peshawar after the embassy attack). 
15 
 
repatriation to Egypt, where they were imprisoned, tortured, and in some cases 
executed.25 
 Second, atrocities befalling Muslim populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Chechnya, Kosovo, Kashmir prompted a crisis of legitimacy in the international system 
that further spurred Muslims in the Arab world and elsewhere to engage in acts of 
solidarity, both armed and unarmed.  Hence, the concern over transnational Islamist 
activists found its way into the various western “interventions” in conflict zones that 
dominated the agenda of the international community during this period.  As 
peacekeepers, diplomats, aid workers, and journalists – so-called “Internationals”26 – 
arrived in various conflict areas, they found that they were often not alone: other 
outsiders were also distributing aid, brokering diplomatic settlements, educating and 
reforming the people and, of course, fighting.27  These outsiders, Muslims and 
specifically Arabs, often operated without the sanction of either a state or an inter-
governmental organization.  Barnett Rubin’s description of al-Qa‘ida in Afghanistan as 
                                                 
25 See Andrew Higgins & Christopher Cooper, Cloak and Dagger: A CIA-backed Team Used Brutal Means 
to Crack Terror Cell, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2001, at A1; THOMAS KELLOGG & HOSSAM EL-HAMALAWY, 
BLACK HOLE: THE FATE OF ISLAMISTS RENDERED TO EGYPT (Human Rights Watch 2005). 
26 I use the term “international community” here to denote both an ideal construct and also a set of 
institutions, ideologies, and practices that give those “Internationals” working in it (diplomats, aid workers, 
peacekeepers) a sense of shared identity, procedures and codes for communicating and acting and 
understanding their work in the world.  For a sampling of the burgeoning subfield of ethnographies 
studying “internationals,” see KIMBERLEY COLES, DEMOCRATIC DESIGNS: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 
AND ELECTORAL PRACTICES IN POSTWAR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (2007); Ilana Feldman, The Quaker Way: 
Ethical Labor and Humanitarian Relief, 34 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 689 (2007); Peter Redfield, Doctors, 
Borders, and Life in Crisis, 20 CULT. ANTHRO. 328 (2005).  As usual, Amitav Ghosh led the way.  See 
Amitav Ghosh, The Global Reservation: Notes Toward an Ethnography of International Peacekeeping, 9 
CULT. ANTHRO. 412 (1994). 
27 If critical scholarship on Internationals is still embryonic, work on such transnational non-western actors 
is almost non-existent or viewed exclusively through the lens of “terrorism studies” whose attempts to 
discover charities providing a “cover for terrorism,” putting aside its ample empirical shortcomings, is 
predicated on a failure to recognize that for many people in the world, support for political struggles can 
take both armed and unarmed forms without any contradiction or embarrassment.  For a relatively nuanced 
study of this phenomenon, see THE CHARITABLE CRESCENT: POLITICS OF AID IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 
(Jérôme Bellion-Jourdain & Jonathan Benthall eds., 2003). 
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constituting “in effect an alternative international community to the official one”28 is true 
for a much larger constellation of groups unrelated to al-Qa‘ida that operates outside of a 
western-dominated international system perceived as inefficient at best, anti-Muslim at 
worst. 
 To the extent Internationals took on the burdens of governance, the concern with a 
group of people grouped under the category of “foreign (Muslim) fighter” created an 
operational dilemma of how to determine which (Muslim) foreigners are fighters.  This is 
no simple task, since many traveling Muslims operate within institutional frameworks 
that were already part of or compatible with the international community, such as UN-
registered NGOs.  In addition, in sites of intervention there were often Muslim travelers 
present for educational, economic, religious, or kinship purposes, in some cases drawing 
on centuries-old networks of circulation, but without any necessary relation to these 
activist efforts.29  In other words, in any given war zone there may be Muslim travelers 
with no political motivation whatsoever; those who are activists of some kind but without 
any ill-will towards the “west”; those who may think of themselves as critics of the 
“west” but have no relation to armed activities; those who wish to wage armed jihad but 
conceptualize this as limited to defending fellow Muslims living under non-Muslim 
occupation or invasion30; and perhaps those few who, like al-Qa‘ida, wish to attack the 
                                                 
28 BARNETT RUBIN, THE FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN at xiv-xv (2nd ed. 2002). 
29 There is an extensive scholarly literature on travel and mobility within the broader Muslim world.  See, 
e.g., MUSLIM TRAVELLERS: PILGRIMAGE, MIGRATION, AND RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION (Dale Eickelman & 
James Piscatori eds., 1990).  On the parallel between al-Qa‘ida and earlier mobilizations of transnational 
resources in an Islamic context, see Engseng Ho, Empire Through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other 
Boat, 46 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y AND HIST. 2, 210 (2004). 
30 One important example is Hudhayfa ‘Azzam, son of ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzam, the most prominent Arab 
involved in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union.  The younger ‘Azzam views transnational Muslim 
participation in jihad against the United States as limited to and arising from the invasion of Iraq.  See Mary 
Fitzgerald, The Son of the Father of Jihad, THE IRISH TIMES (Dublin), July 7, 2006, at 12 (“‘If I saw an 
American or British man wearing a soldier’s uniform inside Iraq I would kill him. . . . If I found the same 
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United States on its own soil allegedly for its support for dictatorial regimes in the 
Middle East and Israel. 
 The application of a poorly defined category such as “foreign fighter” to a 
complex empirical reality of many different “foreign” Muslims necessarily occasions a 
set of particularly thorny, if not outright confused, problems of governance.  Just as the 
standard refrain that one must distinguish between “moderate” (good) Muslims and 
“radical” (bad) Muslims presupposes the need to know all Muslims, the concern over 
foreign (Muslim) fighters necessarily renders (Muslim) foreigners into a categorical 
object that needs to be known and appropriately dealt with.  Before long, however, the 
object of knowledge as constructed – Muslim foreigners – becomes a source of anxiety in 
itself.  This is the problem of what can be called “Muslims out of place.”31 
 Since the early 1990s, the U.S. government and its allies have pursued various 
campaigns against out-of-place Muslims.  We likely are aware of only a small part of the 
total picture, but it is possible to discern two broad approaches.  First, there is the attempt 
to put out-of-place Muslims back into their rightful (national) places, as it were, by 
having them sent home, usually to ongoing detention.  The best-known example of this is 
the extraordinary rendition program, often used to send individuals to their countries of 
                                                                                                                                                 
soldier over the border in Jordan I wouldn't touch him.  In Iraq he is a fighter and an occupier, here he is 
not.’”); see also Nir Rosen, Iraq’s Jordanian Jihadis, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2006, at 54. 
31 The phrase “out of place” appears prominently in two very different texts that inform the ambivalence of 
the term, as signifying both alarming threat and poignant possibility.  Dirt is, famously “matter out of 
place” in the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas, and hence a source of threat in the cultural systems that 
shape understandings of the world.  See MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO (1966).  To be “out of place” is also, of course, a constitutive state of 
separation from “home” (conceived as family or homeland) that can condition new forms of subjectivity.  
See EDWARD W. SAID, OUT OF PLACE: A MEMOIR 294 (1999) (“My search for freedom . . . could only have 
begun because of that rupture . . . Now it does not seem important or even desirable to be ‘right’ and in 
place . . . Better to wander out of place, not to own a house, and not ever to feel too much at home 
anywhere . . .”). 
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origin for interrogation beyond the apparent responsibility of the United States.32  More 
broadly – and more difficult to quantify – are deportations of out-of-place Muslims by 
U.S. client states without the operational involvement of the U.S. government. 
 The second approach is not to erase out-of-placeness, but to perpetuate it by 
detaining such individuals in third countries with which they have no apparent 
relationship.  After the 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, the U.S. developed 
mechanisms for direct control over out-of-place Muslims through indefinite 
extraterritorial detention and interrogation, either openly at Guantánamo or the Bagram 
Theater Internment Facility in Afghanistan, or covertly in “black sites” in Afghanistan, 
eastern Europe, or southeast Asia.33  In May 2005, the CIA held 94 such detainees in its 
own facilities.34  The extraordinary rendition program has also been used to send 
individuals to third countries, especially Jordan and Morocco, some of whom were 
                                                 
32 The number of individuals who have passed through the extraordinary rendition program is unclear.  In 
2002, the CIA acknowledged “rendering” seventy individuals prior to September 2001.  See Written 
statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community 
Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Oct. 17, 2002.  But in September 
2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden estimated that the number of those who had been subjected to the 
program was “mid-range two figures.”  Gen. Michael Hayden, CIA Director, Speech at the Council on 
Foreign Relations (Sept. 7, 2007), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14162/conversation_with_michael_hayden_rush_transcript_federal_news_s
ervice.html.  It is not clear if Hayden was referring to total renditions or only those taking place after 
September 2001.  Either set of figures is true, they suggest that the CIA did not increase its use of rendition 
after 2001 and may even have decreased it. 
33 The shape of the global U.S. detention regime is currently undergoing readjustment.  On January 22, 
2009, President Obama ordered the CIA to close its own standing detention facilities “as expeditiously as 
possible.”  Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009).  The Guantánamo detention facility 
is due to close by January 2010, although the fate of detainees there is yet to be determined.  See Exec. 
Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009).  As for Bagram, the U.S. continues to oppose habeas 
corpus rights for detainees held there.  See In re: Barack Obama, et al., No. 09-8004 (D.C. Cir. filed June 
11, 2009) (appealing lower court ruling extending habeas corpus jurisdiction to Bagram detainees captured 
outside Afghanistan). 
34 See Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel on 
Application of U.S. Obligations Under Art. 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees to John Rizzo, Senior Deputy 
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency 29 (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter Bradbury Memorandum]. 
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subsequently transferred to Guantánamo.35  This arrangement, paradoxically, radicalizes 
the out-of-placeness of the people it targets by attempting to suspend them indefinitely 
beyond the protection of their own governments and outside the concern of the states 
hosting them, but nevertheless within the complete control of the United States.36 
 Sending out-of-place Muslims home or to another location, however, has often 
required effectively excluding them from the protection of the law wherever they are, 
with varying degrees of direct or indirect U.S. involvement.  At the same time, the U.S. 
government through its diplomats, soldiers, and spies, often carries out such campaigns 
while effectively exempted from accountability to local law.  Any U.S. desire for such 
exemptions is of course neither surprising nor entirely based on GWOT imperatives.  But 
juxtaposing them with the measures taken in the name of defeating an enemy itself 
marked primarily as “foreign” elucidates the important question of how different 
outsiders are treated, and how such decisions are made.  I refer to this contrast – 
exclusion from legal protection for out-of-place Muslims, and exemption from legal 
accountability for the U.S. and its allies – as a braided logic of exemption and exclusion.  
Before demonstrating how this logic works in practice, however, it is necessary to clarify 
what is at stake when the U.S. and its allies regard “foreignness” as a potential problem. 
                                                 
35 The best-known case of an individual apparently sent to a non-U.S. facility in a third country is British 
resident Binyam Mohamed, who was captured in Pakistan and rendered to Morocco, as flight records 
obtained by the Council of Europe attest.  See Council of Europe, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful 
Inter-State Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States, Draft Report – Part II (Explanatory 
Memorandum) ¶ 202, AS/JUR (2006) 16 Part II (June 7, 2006).  For more on transfers to Jordan of 
individuals with no apparent tie to that country, see JOANNE MARINER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: CIA 
RENDITIONS TO JORDAN (Human Rights Watch 2008). 
36 The Obama administration has thus far appeared to combine both approaches by allowing “out of place” 
Muslims detained in client states to remain there for interrogation, while preserving the option of renditions 
to home countries.  See Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Relies More on Aid of Allies in Terror Cases, 




C. The Foreign, the Universal (and Enemies) 
What makes the braided logic of exemption and exclusion at work in GWOT seem 
natural?  Perhaps the most obvious answer is some reference to sovereignty.  This 
critique has two sides: domestically, the executive branch is upsetting the balance of 
powers through sweeping assertions of power, while internationally it disregards 
international legitimacy and international law.  In both cases, there is a concern about 
“lawlessness,” expressed as an arbitrary and destructive willfulness.37  This analysis, 
however prescient, is nevertheless inadequate on both counts.  Domestically, there is 
every reason to believe support is widespread (both across the major political parties as 
well as the branches of government) for the need to pursue foreign fighters abroad and 
for at least some of the measures employed to that end.  Internationally, the Bush 
administration’s contemptuous attitude towards international law and institutions should 
not distract from the fact that cooperation with other states38 has always been crucial to 
U.S. “anti-terrorism” policy, both operationally and in terms of legitimacy.39  GWOT is 
                                                 
37 A variant on these accounts are the critiques of sovereignty as enabling permanent states of exception, 
enabling discretion that is unrestrained yet nevertheless juridically grounded.  See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, 
HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans. 1998) (1995).  As Nasser 
Hussain has correctly pointed out, however, the concrete problem is not one of lawlessness per se, but 
rather one of “hyperlegality” – “not a suspension of law but an intensification of an administrative and 
bureaucratic legality” through the proliferation of regulations, statutes, and other written binding norms.  
Nasser Hussain, Beyond Norm and Exception: Guantánamo, 33 CRITICAL INQUIRY 734, 744 (2007). 
38 Perhaps the most striking example of such international “cooperation” was the 2002 visit by officials of 
the People’s Republic of China to Guantánamo to interrogate Chinese citizens detained there.  See, e.g., 
Chinese Interrogation vs. Congressional Oversight: The Uighurs at Guantanamo: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Human Rights and Oversight, 111th Cong. (2009). 
39 In the question period following a speech widely described as repudiating the “war on terror” framework, 
senior Obama advisor and former CIA National Counterterrorism Center director John Brennan signaled 
the ongoing importance of U.S. client states, claiming that GWOT detentions outside of Iraq and 
Afghanistan were “dwindling . . . because foreign governments are standing up to their responsibilities 
now.”  John Brennan, Deputy Nat’l Sec. Adv. for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, Protecting the 
American People from Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Speech at the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies (Aug. 6, 2009).  See also Schmitt & Mazzetti, supra note 36. 
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far too broad an effort to rest solely on one government’s asserted right to do as it pleases 
anywhere on earth. 
 In order to understand the normative framework justifying the braided logic of 
exemption and exclusion, let us return to the emphasis on foreign fighters and analyze not 
what is said about them, but rather the silence around them.  This is where the equal, if 
not greater, “foreignness” of the U.S. and some of its allies in the same sites of 
intervention stands out.  This attitude was vividly demonstrated by Afghan Defense 
Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak when he stressed the foreignness – and hence, 
illegitimacy – of certain rebels by remarking that “[i]n some cases, they have to use 
interpreters to talk to” the local population, as if that were not the case for NATO forces 
as well.40  The point of this observation is not to decry or to satirize, but rather to point 
out how the concern over foreign fighters tends to go hand-in-hand with a curious silence 
about the “foreignness” of others. 
 This blindspot is made possible by a particular rhetorical position towards the 
otherwise unremarkable fact of human diversity that I call the position of the universal.  
To speak from the position of the universal is to assert a veto over the evaluation of 
differences, according to a worldview or set of criteria that one has adopted as 
universal.41  This is not tantamount to simply “imposing” one’s own system or views on 
                                                 
40 John J. Kruzel, Afghan Minister Recommends Border Region Task Force, AMERICAN ARMED FORCES 
PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 22, 2008.  Of course the adoption of this rhetoric by U.S. client states operates also 
according to these regimes’ own political calculations.  Wardak’s statement came in the context of his 
claim that foreign insurgents in Afghanistan outnumbered local ones, see id., a statement clearly intended 
to downplay any domestic concerns over the legitimacy of the Karzai regime. 
41 My approach to the question of universalism is largely anthropological rather than philosophical insofar 
as it is driven by the analysis of how human beings talk about and invoke ideas of the universal rather than 
an attempt to determine its proper content or the validity of its existence.  I take it as a starting point of this 
analysis that such notions are always historically contingent yet their contingency is not by itself an 
argument for or against their normative force in a given context, nor is it a rejection of universalisms as 
such.  See, e.g., Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of 
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others, nor does it necessarily imply arrogance; rather, the position of the universal 
always already acknowledges that some residual differences will remain and may in some 
cases even celebrate diversity.  It also allows for a certain margin of self-critique and self-
correction.  The position of the universal merely gives one the final say as to which 
(empirical) differences are (normatively) permissible and which are ultimately 
problematic. 
 From the position of the universal, the U.S. can frame its own differences with 
local populations as stemming essentially from either side’s failure to live up to certain 
standards – standards over which the U.S. ultimately exercises a veto.  At the same time, 
the U.S. can assign a presumptively illegitimate value to differences between others.  This 
position can be restated thus: our differences with local Muslims are generally legitimate, 
but the differences between local and certain foreign Muslims are not, therefore the latter 
are enemies to us all – a universal enemy.  The foreign fighter is a universal enemy not 
because of any alleged enmity towards or from humanity but because he has been 
declared an enemy by those who occupy the position of the universal. 
 It then becomes easy to justify excluding out-of-place Muslims from legal 
protection while exempting certain westerners from local legal accountability.  The 
unique danger of foreign fighters, local incapacity (to be remedied by training and 
equipping local regimes who must then prove their readiness to “fight their own battles”), 
and a presumption that those occupying the position of the universal can be trusted to 
effectively police themselves all follow quite readily.  I am not suggesting, of course, that 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Law?, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3, 379 (2007).  This approach draws more from attempts to 
complicate the relationship between the universal and the particular and to emphasize the plurality of both.  




a supporter of this logic would deny that the U.S. is “foreign” in a place such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq; but such a person would then have only two choices.  First, she 
could admit that evaluating the legitimacy of these respective outsiders has nothing to do 
with “foreignness” and must instead be done in terms of other substantive or procedural 
values.  Second, she could somehow argue that the U.S. is not foreign in the “same way” 
as foreign fighters, again most likely in reference to those same substantive or procedural 
values.  Either way, there is an irreducible gap between the word “foreign” and the 
normative value for which it stands – and that gap marks the position from which one 
enjoys the ultimate authority to assign value to difference. 
 In distracting from the differences at stake between the U.S. and local populations 
in sites of intervention, declaring enemies of the universal allows one to elide crucial 
questions of what local populations actually think and to ignore how they might evaluate 
and compare different outsiders.  As the phrase “struggle for hearts and minds” implicitly 
recognizes, their choices as to who is merely a foreigner and who is the bearer of 
universal values cannot be assumed in advance.  This further raises important questions 
of who is empowered to make such decisions, and with what consequences.  Addressing 
all of these questions is beyond the scope of this essay, but elucidating the stakes 
involved is not.  The following two case studies are thus devoted to demonstrating how 
the braided logic of exemption and exclusion, arising from the effort to police 
transnational Muslim mobility, works in very different contexts with consequences that 




II. CONTENTIOUS INTERVENTIONS: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND STATE-BUILDING 
In recent decades, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s (BiH) significance for the U.S. has transformed 
from a site of “ethnic conflict,” humanitarian intervention, and nation-building to a front 
in the Global War on Terror that has given Guantánamo one of its most famous 
detainees: Lakhdar Boumediene, the eponymous plaintiff in the landmark Supreme Court 
decision Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).  This shift reflects the increasing 
interest in time over former foreign fighters.  In this section of the paper, I first provide 
some background on out-of-place Muslims in BiH before describing how the logic of 
exclusion has operated in the detention and removal of out-of-place Muslims under U.S. 
pressure.  I then move to detail how the logic of exemption applies to a category of 
outsiders commonly referred to as “Internationals” who occupy the position of the 
universal as described above.  Both of these moves undermine the very state-building 
project in BiH under the General Framework Agreement for Peace (“Dayton Accord”)42 
that the U.S. and its allies ostensibly seek to sponsor. 
 The background of U.S. concerns over out-of-place Muslims is the participation 
of foreign (Muslim) fighters, especially Arab mujahids (religious warriors)43, in the 
                                                 
42 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M [hereinafter 
Dayton Accord]. 
43 Much remains to be investigated about the numbers and nature of Arab volunteers in the war (to say 
nothing of Turks, Iranians, and others).  Most of the information in this section is drawn from and cross-
checked between interviews conducted in BiH in 2006 and 2007, including with Arab and Bosnian ex-
combatants; evidence used by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and 
the copious media production of Arab and other non-Bosnian Muslim participants themselves, including 
first-hand accounts.  For a sampling of publicly available primary materials, see Khalid Hammadi, Tanzim 
al-Qa‘ida min Dakhil Kama Yarwi Abu Jandal (Nasir al-Bahri) al-Haris al-Shakhsi li-Bin Ladin (2) [Al-
Qa‘ida from the Inside, as Told by Abu Jandal (Nasir al-Bahri), Bin Ladin’s Personal Bodyguard, part 2], 
AL-QUDS AL-‘ARABI (London), Mar. 19/20, 2005, at 17; Abu ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (pseudonym), MAWQIF AMIR 
‘ALA AL-MUJAHIDIN AL-‘ARAB [A COMMANDER’S POSITION TOWARDS THE ARAB MUJAHIDS], 
http://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=7023.  There is also a hagiographic genre focusing on 
accounts of miracles [karamat].  See HAMAD AL-QATARI & MAJID AL-MADANI, MIN QISAS AL-SHUHADA’ 
AL-‘ARAB FIL-BUSNA WAL-HARSAK [STORIES OF THE ARAB MARTYRS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA] (2002?).  
Audio hagiographies include: IN THE HEARTS OF GREEN BIRDS (Azzam Publications 1996); UNDER THE 
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Bosnian war (1992-1995) alongside or in the ranks of the Muslim-majority Army of the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, ARBiH).44  
There were also relief organizations from Arab or Islamic countries operating in the war 
zone45, whose relationships with Arab military volunteers are subject to much debate.  In 
both the military and aid realms, Arabs already living in ex-Yugoslavia who had come to 
study from other non-aligned states such as Syria and Iraq played an important 
facilitating role as interpreters and guides, as did Bosnians who had worked or studied in 
the Arab world. 
 The relationships between Bosnian Muslims and Arab activists is a complex 
matter beyond the scope of this paper; one can say that there was both gratitude at their 
solidarity and sacrifice and tension or even hostility over differences in religious practice 
and concerns over proper subordination to the military chain of command.  Arab 
volunteers also developed a reputation for brutality towards captured prisoners, including 
grisly accounts of beheadings.46  In part because of this perception, Arab non-combatants, 
                                                                                                                                                 
SHADES OF SWORDS (Azzam Publications 1997).  Unfortunately one must also be aware of a burgeoning 
sensationalist literature, whose flaws, though glaring, are too extensive to be dealt with in detail here.  See, 
e.g., EVAN KOHLMANN, AL-QAIDA’S JIHAD IN EUROPE: THE AFGHAN-BOSNIAN NETWORK (2004); JOHN 
SCHINDLER, UNHOLY TERROR: BOSNIA, AL-QA‘IDA, AND THE RISE OF GLOBAL JIHAD (2007). 
44 Drawing far less attention have been volunteers from outside ex-Yugoslavia on other sides in the war, 
including Greeks, Ukrainians, and Russians with the Serbs and Dutch and Germans with the Croats.  See 
CEES WIEBES, INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA 1992-1995 at 205-06 (2003). 
45 See Jérôme Bellion-Jourdain, Les Réseaux Transnationaux Islamiques en Bosnie-Herzégovine 
[Transnational Islamist Networks in Bosnia-Herzegovina], in LE NOUVEL ISLAM BALKANIQUE [THE NEW 
BALKAN ISLAM] 429 (Xavier Bougarel & Nathalie Clayer eds., 2001); ZIYAD HADHUL & MUHAMMAD AL-
HUMAYDI, AL-QISSA AL-KAMILA LIL-DAWR AL-SA‘UDI FIL-BUSNA WAL-HARSAK [THE FULL STORY OF THE 
SAUDI ROLE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA] (1998); ANWAR AL-HADI, RIHLAT AL-NAR WAL-THULUJ [THE 
JOURNEY OF FIRE AND ICE] (1996). 
46 See Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment (Mar. 15, 
2006); Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Case. No. IT-04-83-T, Judgment (Sept. 15, 2008). 
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including relief workers, also found themselves the target of kidnappings and assaults by 
opposing forces hoping to exchange them as war captives.47 
 The presence of foreign Muslim fighters was a major concern for the U.S. during 
the negotiations at Dayton, Ohio that ended the war.  “With NATO forces about to arrive 
in Bosnia, we could not tolerate the continued presence of these people in Bosnia,” wrote 
U.S. mediator Richard Holbrooke in his memoirs, citing some mujahids’ unspecified 
“ties to groups in the Middle East that had committed terrorist acts against American 
troops.”48  “One of the key US objectives was to get them out of the country as soon as 
possible,” recalled former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, who co-chaired the Dayton 
conference and later served as the first High Representative of the international 
community to BiH.49 
 This concern was reflected in the final text of the Dayton Accord, which required 
the withdrawal of “All Forces . . . not of local origin” as well as of “all foreign Forces, 
including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, [and] volunteers” within thirty 
days.50  Curiously, the same provision specifically exempted UN and NATO-led 
peacekeeping forces and the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF).  The structure of 
this provision – the exclusion of “foreign” forces paired with an exemption for certain 
outsiders who occupy the position of the universal (NATO and the UN) – is perhaps the 
clearest example of the braided logic that sustains policies against out-of-place Muslims.  
The consequences of this distinction are traced in the next two sections. 
                                                 
47 The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia-Herzegovina (HRC) has heard several cases arising from the 
kidnapping, assault, and unlawful detention of Arab students and aid workers.  See Samy Hermas v. FBiH, 
CH/97/45 (Bosn. & Herz. Human Rights Chamber 1998); H.R. and Mohamed Momani v. FBiH, 
CH/98/946 (Bosn. & Herz. Human Rights Chamber 1999). 
48 RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR 320 (Rev. ed. 1998). 
49 CARL BILDT, PEACE JOURNEY: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA 102 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
1998) (1997). 




A. Exclusion: From Fellow Muslims to Foreign Arabs 
Throughout the post-Dayton period, and especially after 9/11, the U.S. and its allies in 
BiH have sought the exclusion of out-of-place Muslims, including naturalized citizens, 
from legal protection, even at the expense of violating BiH and international law.  These 
efforts have been justified in the name of dealing with terrorist threats, including from so-
called ex-foreign fighters. 
 The Elmudžahedin detachment of ARBiH, where most of the Arab volunteers 
served, was dissolved shortly after the war and most Arab combatants appear to have left 
the country around that time.  An undetermined number, however, obtained BiH 
citizenship by virtue of their army service51 or through marriage to BiH citizens, causing 
Western concerns over foreign fighters to linger.52  In late 1997, the Office of the High 
Representative of the International Community in BiH (OHR) – the country’s de facto 
chief executive after the Dayton Accord, backed by thousands of troops in the NATO-led 
Stabilization Force (SFOR)53 – imposed the country’s first post-war citizenship law, later 
approved by the BiH Parliament without possibility of amendment.  The law included 
fairly standard denaturalization powers.54  In addition, articles 40 and 41 created a special 
                                                 
51 According to an amendment enacted in May 1993 and in effect until the OHR-imposed citizenship law, 
in 1997 foreign members of the Bosnian armed forces would obtain citizenship without having to fulfill the 
standard naturalization requirements (BH Gazette 11/93, 10 May 1993). 
52 In contrast to the widespread (and culturally coded) concern that BiH citizenship in itself could facilitate 
“terrorist” activities, there has been no action to revoke the naturalization of individuals from other ex-
Yugoslav republics implicated in war crimes.  In the case of a retired Croatian general seeking refuge in 
BiH from war crimes charges in his own country, the State Court of BiH recently expressed concern that 
“the privilege of dual citizenship and constitutional ban on extradition of a country’s own nationals[] are 
frequently abused for the purpose of avoiding criminal prosecution in the former [Yugoslav] republics.”  
Decision, Ex-21/09 at 3 (Bosn. & Herz. State Court 2009). 
53 In 2005, SFOR was succeeded by a European Union Force (EUFOR) with largely the same composition, 
as well as a residual NATO element in the country. 
54 HR Decision on the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH Gazette 4/97, 23 Dec 1997) 
[hereinafter 1997 BiH Law on Citizenship] permitted denationalization in cases of fraudulent acquisition of 
28 
 
hybrid State Commission charged with reviewing wartime naturalizations, composed of 
six Bosnian and three international members.  Although the Commission appears to have 
revoked few if any citizenships at the time, its composition and manner of establishment 
both reflect intimate external involvement over one of the core dimensions of 
sovereignty, namely citizenship. 
 In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, 
U.S. pressure to “clean up” the problem of foreign Muslims increased dramatically.  In 
October, Bosnian authorities summarily stripped war veteran Usama Faraj Allah, aka 
‘Imad al-Masri or Eslam Durmo, of his BiH citizenship without acquiring proper 
approval from all relevant state bodies or providing opportunity for appeal.  Durmo was 
forcibly repatriated to Egypt the next day, where he was reportedly tortured before being 
convicted by a military court in a trial that failed to meet minimum international 
standards.55  A representative of the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo participated in the meeting 
where the decision to expel Durmo was taken.56  The Human Rights Chamber for BiH 
(HRC) – a hybrid court composed of local and European jurists – later found that the 
denationalization and expulsion had violated the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), including the right to be free of torture or inhuman treatment and the right to a 
remedy.57 
                                                                                                                                                 
citizenship, prohibited service in a foreign military, and failure to fulfill naturalization conditions after the 
law’s entrance into force (art. 23). 
55 “Egypt: Further information on forcible return / Risk of Torture, Al-Sharif Hassan Saad, Ussama Farag 
Allah,” Amnesty International urgent action (MDE 12/015/2002), Apr. 23, 2002.  Faraj Allah had been 
arrested in Bosnia several months before 9/11 on suspicion of having certified untrue statements. 
56 See Eslam Durmo v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and FBiH, CH/02/9842 ¶ 58 (Bosn. & Herz. Human Rights 
Chamber 2003). 
57 See id. ¶¶ 82-89, 130.  Durmo was repatriated with Egyptian citizen and BiH resident Sa‘d Hasan al-
Sharif, who was reportedly released and lives in Egypt. 
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 Also in October 2001, authorities arrested Abdel Halim Khafagy, an Egyptian 
resident of Germany who was visiting BiH in connection with his business as a publisher 
of translations of Islamic books into European languages.  Khafagy, then a 69-year-old 
former activist in the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and a well-known author58, was detained 
at the U.S. Eagle base at Tuzla for several weeks before being expelled to Egypt.  
German intelligence officers visiting him at Eagle base reported seeing his face bloody 
and stitched from beatings.59  Khafagy was released by Egyptian authorities without 
charge and later returned to Germany60, where the Bundestag is investigating his 
mistreatment.61 
 In perhaps the best-known case of actions against Arabs in BiH, authorities in 
October 2001 detained six men of Algerian origin, five of them naturalized BiH citizens, 
at the behest of U.S. authorities who accused them of plotting to bomb the American and 
British embassies in Sarajevo.  In a meeting with Alija Behmen, Prime Minister of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH)62, U.S. chargé d’affaires Christopher Hoh 
reportedly delivered a threat to withdraw U.S. peacekeeping forces and cut diplomatic 
relations if the men were not arrested, adding, “If we leave Bosnia, God save your 
                                                 
58 Ironically, Khafagy’s best-known work is his memoir of 16 years as a political prisoner in Egypt.  See 
‘ABD AL-HALIM KHAFAJI, ‘INDAMA GHABAT AL-SHAMS: QISSAT AL-‘UMR AL-THANI FIL-SUJUN WAL-
MU‘TAQALAT [WHEN THE SUN VANISHED: THE TALE OF THE SECOND SPELL IN PRISONS AND DETENTION 
CENTERS] (1979). 
59 See Martin Kreickenbaum, Germany’s Role in Illegal U.S. “Anti-Terror” Activities, WORLD SOCIALIST 
WEB SITE, Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/nov2006/germ-n09.shtml. 
60 See Majdi Sa‘id, Fi Diyafat Muslimi Almanya [In the Hospitality of Germany’s Muslims], 
ISLAMONLINE.NET, Aug. 1, 2006, 
http://www.islamonline.net/arabic/Daawa/NonMuslims/2006/08/01.shtml. 
61 See Press Release, Bundestag, Kanzleramt war über den Fall Khafagy informiert [Chancellor’s Office 
Was Informed of Khafagy Incident] (July 17, 2009). 
62 Under the Dayton Accord, Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.  See Dayton Accord, supra note 42, Annex IV, art. I(3). 
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country, Mr. Prime Minister.”63  In January 2002, the men were handed over to U.S. 
authorities and transferred to Guantánamo, notwithstanding an order for their release 
from the FBiH Supreme Court due to lack of evidence.  Even the high representative, 
Wolfgang Petritsch, claimed he was powerless to stop the move: “If I would have 
protested more vocally at the time against this obvious breach of law, I believe it would 
have jeopardized the international mission.”64  Local authorities subsequently exonerated 
the men of any wrongdoing and the HRC found that their handover to U.S. authorities 
and expulsion violated a number of BiH’s obligations under the ECHR.65  Over six years 
and several U.S. Supreme Court decisions66 later, the U.S. government withdrew nearly 
all of its allegations against the men and a federal district court judge ordered the release 
of five of them.67 
 The expulsion of the Algerians in particular provoked widespread outrage, 
including tense confrontations between protesters and police.  Subsequent efforts to deal 
with the “problem” of naturalized foreigners and specifically some eight hundred people 
of “Afro-Asian” origin (approximately 5% of all naturalizations since independence), 
were more legalistic, multilateral, and systematic.  In 2005, the BiH Parliamentary 
                                                 
63 Marc Perelman, From Sarajevo to Guantanamo: The Strange Case of the Algerian Six, MOTHER JONES 
ONLINE, Dec. 4, 2007, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2007/12/sarajevo-guantanamo-strange-case-
algerian-six. 
64 Id. 
65 See Hadž Boudellaa et al. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and FBiH, CH/02/8679 (Bosn. & Herz. Human 
Rights Chamber 2002); Belkasem Bensayah v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and FBiH, CH/02/9499 (Bosn. & 
Herz. Human Rights Chamber 2003). 
66 See, for example, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (detainees in Guantánamo are entitled to seek the 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 
S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that the writ extends to Guantánamo under the U.S. Constitution). 
67 See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008).  The sixth man, Belkacem Bensayah, is 
appealing the decision to continue his detention.  See Boumediene v. Obama, No. 08-5537 (D.C. Cir. filed 
Dec. 31, 2008). 
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Assembly adopted a series of amendments to the citizenship law68 empowering the State 
Commission to review all naturalizations from April 6, 1992 to January 1, 2006 (instead 
of those granted during the war only) and to withdraw citizenship in any case where 
“regulations in force in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of the 
naturalization had not been applied.”69  It is possibly the loosest standard for 
denationalization in the world,70 lacking requirements of intent or even knowledge of 
regulatory improprieties on behalf of the individual concerned.  Further, the State 
Commission conducted its reviews in closed sessions without affording applicants the 
right to a hearing.  The amendments also eviscerated standard appeal process, leaving 
petitioners essentially without any right to a hearing, either in the first instance or upon 
review.71 
 In early 2006, the State Commission began reviewing the files of the 10% of 
those naturalized since independence who were not from other former Yugoslav 
                                                 
68 In the interests of full disclosure: I worked with the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia-
Herzegovina on an amicus curiae brief before CCBH challenging the compatibility of the 2005 citizenship 
law amendments with the BiH constitution and BiH’s international legal obligations.  See “Expert Opinion 
on Deprivation of Nationality” submitted by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School in the 
case of Al Husin Imad (AP 1222/07). 
69 BiH Law on Citizenship (amended 2005), art. 41(4)(a).  The original version of the law employed the 
same standard but placed the burden on the State Commission to demonstrate that the individual concerned 
was clearly aware of the impropriety; the law also allowed people to keep their citizenship if they 
subsequently fulfilled naturalization requirements anyway.  See 1997 BiH Law on Citizenship, supra note 
54, art. 41(3).  The 2005 amendments did away with these constraints.  This provision is also separate from 
and supplemental to the Commission’s power to denationalize in cases of fraud, lack of a “genuine link” 
with the country or other more traditional grounds.  See BiH Law on Citizenship (amended 2005), arts. 
23(4)-(6), 41(4)(a)-(d). 
70 Major treatises on comparative nationality law do not contain any evidence of denationalization laws as 
sweeping as BiH’s.  See, e.g., PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2nd ed. 1979); RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994).  A 
recent survey of laws on loss of nationality amongst 24 (mostly European) states does not indicate anything 
similar.  See Gerard-René de Groot, Loss of Nationality: A Critical Inventory, in RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF 
DUAL NATIONALS: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS 201 (David Martin & Kay Hailbronner eds., 2003). 
71 Under the 2005 amendments, the State Commission’s decisions are no longer open to standard 
administrative appeal processes, see BiH Law on Citizenship (amended 2005), supra note 69, art. 41(8)).  
These include a number of procedural safeguards, including rights to participate in fact-finding processes 
guaranteed in the Law on Administrative Procedure (BH Gazette, 29/02, 12/04), arts. 133, 219, 225.  
Subsequent appeals to higher courts also do not include the right to a hearing. 
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republics, mailing out brief (often 1-2 page) decisions soon thereafter.  In September 
2006, BiH authorities deported one denationalized individual, a Tunisian named 
Badreddine Ferchichi, under murky circumstances.  Ferchichi was allegedly abused upon 
his return home72 and later sentenced by a military tribunal to three years in prison for 
service in a “foreign army or terrorist organization operating abroad.”73  By December 
2008, 660 citizenships had been revoked, about 400 of them held by individuals of “Afro-
Asian” origin, and deportation proceedings have begun against an unknown number.74  
As of July 2009, seven men were held in the Lukavica detention center outside Sarajevo 
pending deportation, six of them Arabs.  Human rights groups have expressed concerns 
that some of these men may face torture or other ill-treatment if deported to their 
countries of origin for alleged dissident activities, suspected affiliation with “Islamist” 
movements, avoidance of military service in their countries of origin or violation of laws 
prohibiting participation in foreign armies.75 
                                                 
72 See IN THE NAME OF SECURITY: ROUTINE ABUSES IN TUNISIA 31 (Amnesty International 2008) (reporting 
that Ferchichi was “detained incommunicado for six days, during which he alleged he was beaten [and] 
suspended upside down and in the poulet rôti [“roast chicken”] position”). 
73 See Luiza Toscane, Le Tribunal Militaire Condamne Badreddine Ferchichi [Military Tribunal Convicts 
Badreddine Ferchichi], GENERATION TUNEZINE, May 21, 2009, http://generationtunezine.20minutes-
blogs.fr/archive/2009/05/21/le-tribunal-militaire-condamne-badreddine-ferchichi.html. 
74 See Bosnian Commission Head Outlines Results of Citizenship Review Probe, BBC MONITORING, Dec. 
15, 2008 (summary of interview with State Commission chairman on BiH television).  At least three other 
Arabs have been deported from BiH in recent years.  In December 2007, an Algerian, Atau Mimun, was 
forcibly repatriated after having lost his BiH citizenship.  Notably, Dragan Mektić, director of the BiH 
Security Ministry’s department of foreigners’ affairs, alluded to “assistance from other agencies” [uz 
pomoć drugih agencija] in tracking and deporting Mimun.  See Marija Taušan, Deportovan Alžirac Atau 
Mimun [Deportation of Algerian Atau Mimun], NEZAVISNE NOVINE (Banja Luka), Dec. 13, 2007.  Two 
other Arab war veterans, Ali Hamad al-Zayar and Abduladhim Maktouf, were deported in 2009 after 
completing prison sentences.  See Hani al-Fardan, Ba‘da an qada 12 ‘am fil-sijn bi-tuhmat tafjir “Mustar 
al-Kuruwatiyya” al-’Intirbul yanqul al-Zayar min al-Busna ila al-Bahrayn [After Spending 12 Years in 
Prison Accused of the Bombing of Croatian Mostar, Interpol Moves al-Zayar from Bosnia to Bahrain], AL-
WASAT (Manama), Apr. 1, 2009; ‘Abd al-Baqi Khalifa, al-Busna: Tarhil ‘Iraqi wa matalib bi-tard Abu 
Hamza al-Suri [Bosnia: Iraqi Deported, Demands for Expulsion of Abu Hamza], AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 
(London), June 23, 2009 (giving Maktouf’s surname as Ma‘tuf). 
75 See Joint Letter from Amnesty International, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia-




 The State Commission’s refusal to allow individuals a hearing before deciding on 
denationalization is particularly disturbing, as ECHR article 6(1) guarantees a “fair and 
public hearing” by “an independent and impartial tribunal” in proceedings that determine 
an individual’s “civil rights and obligations.”76  The Constitutional Court of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (CCBH) first considered this issue in an appeal by Imad Husin, aka Abu 
Hamza al-Suri, a Syrian-born ARBiH war veteran who had lived in the former 
Yugoslavia since the early 1980s and raised a family with a Bosnian woman.  The CCBH 
noted that the Commission’s conduct – given the lack of any evidence of a “threat to 
national security” from the petitioner – gave “rise to a suspicion” that the 
denationalization decision was “made for an ulterior purpose.”77  The CCBH nevertheless 
held that article 6(1) did not apply, relying on a case from the now-defunct European 
Commission of Human Rights interpreting the provision’s reference to “civil rights and 
obligations” as limited to private law matters only.  Therefore, according to this 
reasoning, article 6(1) is inapplicable to so-called “public law” acts, including citizenship 
and immigration decisions.78  The CCBH did not attempt to reconcile this stance with 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights79 or decisions of its own80 that 
                                                 
76 Under the BiH Constitution (which is also an annex to the Dayton Accord), the ECHR applies directly in 
BiH and “shall have priority over all other law.”  Dayton Accord, supra note 42, Annex IV, art. II(2). 
77 See Imad al Husin, AP-1222/07 ¶¶ 68, 92 (Bosn. & Herz. 2008).  The CCBH upheld the petitioner’s 
denationalization but cancelled the deportation order against him, remanding to a lower court for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine if deportation resulting in separation from petitioner’s cancer-stricken 
Bosnian wife and their children would violate his family rights under ECHR.  Nevertheless, two days after 
the decision, the petitioner was arrested without charge and placed in immigration detention pending the 
resolution of the case.  See Joint statement from Amnesty International, Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights in BiH, and Human Rights Watch, Halt Efforts to Deport Syrian at Risk of Torture: Abide by 
European and Bosnian Court Warnings Against Expulsion (Oct. 17, 2008), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/10/23/bosnia-and-herzegovina-halt-effort-deport-syrian-risk-torture. 
78 See Imad Al Husin ¶¶ 46-48 (quoting Philip Burnett Franklin Agee v. UK, 7 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 164, 175 (1976)).  That portion of the Agee case dealt with an alien’s right to contest expulsion, the 
petitioner in that case was not citizen challenging denationalization. 
79 See, e.g., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, ECtHR 6878/75 (suspension of medical 
licenses), Raimondo v. Italy, ECtHR 12945/87 (land confiscation); Skärby v. Sweden, ECtHR 
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accorded the fair hearing protections of article 6(1) to other rights apparently no less 
“public” in nature, such as the right to stand in parliamentary elections. 
 There is little doubt that the State Commission’s work was driven primarily by 
western, and especially U.S., pressure.  One of the State Commission’s nine members 
was a U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel and chief legal adviser to NATO headquarters in 
BiH.81  An OHR task force works directly with the State Commission82 and the Peace 
Implementation Council Steering Board, which oversees OHR, noted the State 
Commission’s “critical importance for the counter-terrorism agenda.”83  In 2007, then 
High Representative Miroslav Lajčák linked expulsion of Arabs to progress on relaxing 
                                                                                                                                                 
14/1989/174/230 (application of planning laws), Guchez v. Belgium, 40 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
109 (1984) (right to practice architecture as profession); Lombardo v. Italy, ECtHR 12490/86 (judge’s right 
to pension). 
80 See DEPOS – Demokratski pokret Srpske, AP-2679/06 ¶ 21 (Bosn. & Herz. 2006) (finding that the right 
to stand in a parliamentary election was a “civil right” deserving of Art. 6 procedural guarantees).  In 
another case, CCBH applied article 6(1) to customs tariffs decisions, rightfully treating it as a broad 
safeguard against arbitrary state action: 
 
[E]ven if some rights could clearly be classified as being in the field of public law which 
falls outside the scope of Article 6 of European Convention, it is necessary, within the 
national framework, to secure the minimum procedural guarantees of the conduct of 
proceedings in accordance with Article 6 . . .  [T]he individual must be protected from the 
arbitrary actions of the state and . . . any failure in this regard may call for an application 
of Article 6 of the European Convention.  The main purpose of this Article, as well as of 
the entire European Convention, is indeed the protection of individuals from the arbitrary 
actions of the state. 
 
Meat Industry «Lijanovići» LLC, U-148-03 ¶¶ 51-52 (Bosn. & Herz. 2003) (emphasis added). 
81 See BiH Council of Ministers, 108th Session Conclusions (Feb. 16, 2006) (announcing appointment of 
State Commission members); Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 956d mtg., Agenda Item 13.1: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Commission for the Revision of Naturalisation Decisions, Appointment of the 
International Members Appendix 2, CM/Notes/956/13.1 (Feb. 14, 2006) (CVs of international members). 
 The credibility of the State Commission was further called into question when its chairman, Assistant 
Security Minister Vjekoslav Vuković, was arrested in Croatia (whose nationality he also holds) in January 
2009 in connection with an attempted murder there.  Vuković was suspended from his post, which includes 
responsibility for combating organized crime and terrorism, for several months.  The charges are still 
pending. 
82 See OHR, “29th Report of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations” (Jan. 31, 2006); “Report to the 
European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, June-December 2005” (Jan, 28, 
2006). 




European visa requirements.84  The U.S. government has praised the amendments 
strengthening the State Commission as “critical . . . to address[ing] the problem of 
foreign extremists who obtained Bosnian citizenship illegally.”85 
 Notably, the State Commission’s sweeping mandate was likely necessary given 
the paucity of actual cases involving alleged criminal or subversive activity on the part of 
naturalized citizens of Arab origin.86  According to one diplomatic source, “We can’t 
pretend there is some imminent threat.  That is not the case.”87  The mindset at work was 
probably most bluntly expressed by Lajčák’s deputy, U.S. State Department official Raffi 
Gregorian, when he described Arab ex-combatants in BiH as “alien.  They look alien.  
They talk alien.  They act alien.  This is a parochial society that has its own approach to 
Islam, and they don’t fit in.”88 
 
B. Exemption: Constitutionalism or Protectorate? 
In stark contrast to the efforts to push out-of-place Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
outside of legal protection despite court decisions and other legal obstacles, exemption of 
                                                 
84 After a tense meeting with BiH Security Minister Tarik Sadović reportedly dealing with the expulsion of 
denationalized Arabs, Lajčák warned: “Further visa facilitation with the European Union and other states 
will depend in large part on whether the Minister is able to carry out the tough actions needed in this area . . 
.”  Press Release, Office of the High Representative, Lajčák meets Sadović; concerned by developments in 
Ministry of Security (July 20, 2007). 
 Sadović was removed from his post in July 2009, an incident widely attributed in Bosnian media to 
pressure from U.S. officials to speed up deportations of Arabs.  See, e.g., Bosnia Parliament Sacks Security 
Minister, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 22, 2009; Bosnian Leader “Yielded” to U.S. “Pressure” Over 
Dismissal – Security Minister, BBC MONITORING, July 23, 2009 (summary of interview with Sadović in 
Dani magazine). 
85 “U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Central and Eastern Europe: Country 
Assessment – Bosnia,” January 2007, available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/92672.htm. 
86 There has been one war crimes conviction (KŽ 32/05) involving Arabs in BiH, plus a handful of criminal 
cases, including a September 1997 car bombing (KŽ 41/2000).  Full disclosure: I was part of a clinical 
legal team representing Ahmed Zaid Zuhair, a Saudi detainee in Guantánamo who was convicted in 
absentia in the bombing case, in his habeas corpus action before the U.S. government.  Mr. Zuhair denied 
the allegation and was repatriated to Saudi Arabia in June 2009. 
87 Nicholas Wood, Bosnia Changes its Mind on Foreign Fighters: Once Welcomed, Many Face 
Deportation, INT’L HERALD-TRIB., Aug. 1, 2007, at 2. 
88 Jonathan Finer, In Bosnia, Former Fighters Face Expulsion, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2007, at A14. 
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“Internationals” from local legal accountability is part of the DNA of the post-Dayton 
state. 
 This is unsurprising, as much of the constitutional and institutional blueprint of 
the state was laid out in a multilateral peace treaty implemented by the international 
community.  Internationals – even at the level of individual foreign citizens serving as 
government officials – play a central role in governance through a variety of institutions, 
giving rise to the charge that BiH is less an independent state and more a Euro-American 
protectorate often ruling undemocratically.89  Most important is OHR, with its ability to 
impose legislation and sack elected officials.90  One third of the nine-member 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina (CCBH) consists of foreign nationals 
appointed by the president of the European Court of Human Rights in consultation with 
the BiH presidency, giving the international community a greater voting bloc than any 
                                                 
89 See, e.g., DOMINIK ZAUM, THE SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX: THE NORMS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
STATEBUILDING 81-117 (2007); Gerald Knaus & Felix Martin, Travails of the European Raj: Lessons from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 J. OF DEMOCRACY 3, 60 (2003); DAVID CHANDLER, BOSNIA: FAKING 
DEMOCRACY AFTER DAYTON (2000).  The problem of accountability of international institutions is common 
to other “transitional administrations,” where international organizations take on full governance powers, as 
in Kosovo and East Timor.  See, e.g., BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: ENHANCING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN KOSOVO (Human Rights Watch 2009); THE APPARENT LACK OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCES IN KOSOVO AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
(Amnesty International 2004). 
90 OHR’s mandate is based in the Dayton Accord, supra note 42, Annex X, art. II.  The specific power to 
impose legislation and remove officials was elaborated by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which 
oversees the implementation of Dayton.  See “PIC Bonn Conclusions,” art. 11, Dec. 10, 1997.  The OHR is 
concurrently the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) to BiH, charged with overseeing the 
European Union’s role in BiH and the country’s possible move towards EU integration.  The closure of 
OHR, long-envisioned as a transitional institution, would ostensibly signal a shift from shared U.S.-EU 
dominance in the country to EU primacy.  OHR’s previous June 30, 2008 closure date, however, has been 
indefinitely postponed.  See Miroslav Lajčák, High Rep. of the Int’l Community, Remarks Following the 
Implementation Council Steering Board Sessions (Feb. 27, 2008) (outlining conditions for end of OHR’s 
mandate, including “Fiscal Sustainability of the State” and “Entrenchment of the Rule of Law”). 
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single ethnic group.91  A European-staffed Integrated Police Unit (IPU), with the power 
to conduct autonomous operations, superseded the UN IPTF in 2002.92 
 The extensive role of the U.S. and EU in managing post-Dayton Bosnia has given 
rise to an entire class of peacekeepers, bureaucrats, and contractors, who enjoy broad 
exemptions from the BiH legal system.  Some of these immunities resemble those 
enjoyed by an occupying power far more than they do a status of forces agreement 
(SOFAs) between allies.93  The Dayton Accord grants “exclusive jurisdiction” over 
NATO military personnel to their home states “in respect of any criminal or disciplinary 
offenses which may be committed by them” in BiH.94  Similarly, the Dayton Accord 
grants IPTF personnel and even their families the sweeping privileges normally accorded 
only to diplomatic envoys and the most senior UN officials, including immunity from 
arrest or any criminal prosecution.95  Ordinary international civil servants and their 
families also enjoy the status of diplomats under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
                                                 
91 Dayton Accord, supra note 42, Annex IV, art. VI(1)(a). 
92 In addition, a variety of key state institutions in BiH were staffed by non-BiH nationals for years after 
Dayton.  Until 2005, the Central Bank of BiH was run by foreign governors.  Until the end of 2003, respect 
for the European Convention on Human Rights was guaranteed by the HRC, which had a majority of non-
BiH judges.  For an overview of the mandate and history of HRC, and a critique of its allegedly premature 
dissolution, see Manfred Nowak, Introduction, HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BIH: DIGEST OF DECISIONS, 
1996-2002, 1 (2003). 
93 See the discussion on immunities of occupying powers, infra, Part III(B).  The immunities are also more 
sweeping than the standard status of forces agreements for consensual peacekeeping operations.  Most UN 
peacekeeping forces enjoy immunity from local jurisdiction as a whole, but individual peacekeepers 
generally enjoy immunity from local civil jurisdiction only in relation to official acts.  See Chanaka 
Wickremasinghe & Guglielmo Verdirame, Responsibility and Liability for Violations of Human Rights in 
the Course of UN Field Operations, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 465, 482 (Craig Scott ed., 2001). 
94 See Dayton Accord, supra note 42, Appendix B to Annex IA, art. VII (emphasis added). 
95 See Dayton Accord, supra note 42, Annex XI, art. II(6) (“In particular, they shall enjoy inviolability, 
shall not be subject to any form of arrest or detention, and shall have absolute immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction.”).  This provision extends the protections of section 19 of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations to IPTF personnel and their families.  Section 19 stipulates that “the 
[UN] Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General shall be accorded in respect of themselves, 
their spouses and minor children, the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to 
diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law.”  Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations art. V, § 19, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter, U.N. Immunities Convention]. 
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Relations.  These include: OHR personnel, the head of the local mission of the 
Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and those she or he 
designates as part of the election commission, the human rights Ombudsperson, members 
of the HRC, and even members of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments .96 
 One could argue that such sweeping powers were necessary in order to facilitate 
an ambitious post-war state-building project agreed upon by the people of BiH through 
their political representatives who signed the Dayton Accord, and that they are being 
gradually dispensed with.97  While such arguments undoubtedly have some merit, there 
are competing considerations.  First, in granting diplomatic immunity to ordinary mission 
staff and their families, the post-Dayton state goes far beyond conventional UN 
peacekeeping missions.  Normally civilian personnel working for the UN have only 
“functional” immunity, which does not protect against arrest or detention98; or they may 
enjoy “expert” immunity, which protects from arrest, but only insofar as is “necessary for 
the independent exercise of their functions during the period of their missions.”99  
Second, whereas diplomatic immunity is always constrained by the ultimate ability of 
states to declare diplomats persona non grata and expel them, in BiH international 
personnel perform crucial governmental functions and for all practical purposes cannot 
be expelled by the local sovereign – in other words, diplomatic immunity in BiH seems to 
                                                 
96 See Dayton Accord, supra note 42, Annex III, art. III(3)-(4); Annex VI, art. III(4); Annex VIII, art. III(3); 
Annex X, art. III(4).  These immunities are described in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
arts. 29-36, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
97 In the 14 years since the Dayton Accord was signed, some of the institutions granted immunity therein 
have either closed or are now entirely staffed by BiH citizens.  The Human Rights Ombudsman and the 
electoral commission are no longer run by Internationals and the HRC no longer exists. 
98 See Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not To Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103, 110 (2002) (“The vast majority of United Nations civilian personnel 
recruited by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and deployed to the field enjoy only the limited 
immunity granted under Immunities Convention Article V Section 18.”).  Section 18 sets out a regime that 
is more limited than that accorded to either diplomats or experts on mission and does not include immunity 
from arrest.  See U.N. Immunities Convention, supra note 95, art. VI., § 18. 
99 U.N. Immunities Convention, supra note 95, art. VI., § 22. 
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equal absolute immunity.  Third, there is an inherent tension between this lack of 
accountability (on the part of foreigners, no less) and the project of building a sovereign, 
independent, and democratic state.100  This tension emerged clearly, for example, when 
Internationals resisted the use of the new Bosnian Konvertible Mark – which they 
introduced to help unify BiH through displacing the use of Yugoslav, Croatian, and other 
currencies – to pay their own salaries.101 
 Unfortunately, these immunities have effectively shielded Internationals for a 
variety of acts against individuals and property that would otherwise likely violate 
international human rights standards or BiH law.  The litigation over the property in 
Glamoč training ground and firing range, divided between SFOR and the FBiH Army, 
illustrates the problem of accountability for Internationals.  The area’s Bosnian Serb 
former residents petitioned the HRC for return of their property or monetary 
compensation; the claims by owners of land used by the FBiH Army prevailed102, 
whereas the petition by those whose land was used by SFOR was rejected as 
inadmissible.  The HRC noted that its mandate (itself part of the Dayton Accord) did “not 
give [it] jurisdiction to consider applications directed against SFOR”103 and reasoned that 
because SFOR’s actions could not be imputed to FBiH, there was simply no respondent 
available.  In another well-known case, SFOR peacekeepers in April 2004 raided an 
Orthodox parish in Pale in a failed attempt to capture Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian 
Serb politician wanted for war crimes.  The raid resulted in severe injuries to an Orthodox 
                                                 
100 Rawski also notes some of these objections.  See Rawski, supra note 98. 
101 COLES, supra note 26, at 69-70. 
102 The dispute arose when funds set aside to compensate the petitioners became unavailable due to severe 
budget cuts imposed on FBiH by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  See Ubović et al. v. 
FBiH, CH/99/2425 ¶ 51 (Bosn. & Herz. Human Rights Chamber 2001). 
103 Decision on Admissibility, Hajder et al. v. FBiH, CH/00/3771 ¶ 19 (Bosn. & Herz. Human Rights 
Chamber 2002).  Hence, in both cases, Internationals were ultimately dictating outcomes without 
possibility of appearing before the HRC as respondents. 
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priest and his son, neither of them linked to Karadžić104;  SFOR rejected the victims’ 
compensation claim.105  SFOR has also detained BiH citizens without judicial authority 
or charge, in one case for over three months.106  
 The logic of exemption featured prominently in the scandals over the involvement 
of Internationals in sex trafficking in BiH.  IPTF personnel and civilian employees of 
Virginia-based DynCorp working on contract for both IPTF and SFOR have been 
accused of involvement with prostitution and sex trafficking in BiH, as customers, 
procurers, and purchasers, but none have faced criminal prosecution in any country.107  In 
November 2002, Human Rights Watch reported that 18 IPTF monitors implicated in sex 
trafficking or prostitution had been repatriated and never prosecuted.  An investigation by 
the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) named five DynCorp employees in 
Bosnia as having purchased women for sex work, all of them subsequently repatriated by 
DynCorp before they could face charges or testify against others.  A report by the UN 
Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina documented the discovery by local police of two foreign 
sex workers being held against their will in the basement of an SFOR contractor’s home 
                                                 
104 See Press Statement, SFOR, SFOR Operation in Pale – Additional Information (Apr. 2, 2004) (“Neither 
of the injured personnel are being investigated or detained in anyway by SFOR.”). 
105 See EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA: SUMMARY OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS IN THE REGION: 
JANUARY-JUNE 2005 at 13(Amnesty International 2005). 
106 THE APPARENT LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCES IN KOSOVO 
AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, supra note 89, at 23-26. 
107 Much of this information was brought to light through labor disputes with whistleblowers.  Kathryn 
Bolkovac, a DynCorp contractor detailed to IPTF, won a wrongful termination suit against her employer in 
an employment tribunal in Southampton, UK in November 2002.  Former DynCorp engineer Ben Johnston 
brought a RICO suit against DynCorp in a Texas court alleging that his firing was part of a conspiracy to 
obstruct a U.S. Army investigation into DynCorp involvement in sex trafficking; the case was settled 
shortly after Bolkovac’s victory in the UK.  See Robert Capps, Sex-slave Whistle-Blowers Vindicated, 
SALON.COM, Aug. 6, 2002, http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/08/06/dyncorp/index.html. 
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after having been purchased for 7,000 Deutschmarks.  The contractor was subsequently 
repatriated.108 
 Having sketched both the logics of exemption and exclusion, we can now see how 
they come together if we recall that the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
has twice rendered verdicts in favor of out-of-place Muslims unlawfully deported, but in 
both of those cases, liability was limited to Bosnian authorities.  The all-important role of 
the U.S. figured prominently in the narratives of both decisions, but there was never any 
question of its potential accountability to local authorities for act committed in BiH 
territory against BiH citizens and foreigners.  At the same time, Internationals enjoy 
immunity for their acts, including involvement in sex crimes.  Both of these types of 
exclusions and exemptions reflect a subordination of the rule of law in BiH and the 
integrity of its nascent institutions to U.S. imperatives.  It is indisputable that the project 
of building a sovereign democratic state in BiH from the outside would always be riddled 
with tensions.  But U.S. pressures have turned these tensions into outright contradictions. 
 
III. THINKING LOCALLY, DETAINING GLOBALLY: IRAQ AND THE LAWS OF WAR 
Nowhere has the targeting of out-of-place Muslims, and the accompanying braided logic 
of exclusion and exemption, been more apparent than in U.S.-dominated Iraq.  This 
section of the paper charts the emergence of out-of-place Muslims as a “problem” in Iraq, 
in the move from the Ba‘th regime’s pan-Arabist policies to the U.S. anxiety over 
controlling transnational Muslim mobility.  It demonstrates how, as in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the U.S. in Iraq has consistently sought to place certain outsiders, namely 
                                                 
108 See MARTINA VANDENBERG, HOPES BETRAYED: TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS TO POST-
CONFLICT BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FOR FORCED PROSTITUTION 49-68 (Human Rights Watch 2002). 
42 
 
westerners, above local legal accountability while consistently placing other outsiders, 
suspected of being foreign fighters, outside legal protection.  The failure to bring U.S. 
troops and contractors to local (or any other form) of justice for crimes has been 
extensively documented elsewhere; but the treatment of other foreigners, including 
torture and expulsion to detention outside the country, has received far less attention. 
 In Iraq, the local-foreign divide seen as pivotal by the U.S. collided with the 
privileged position that citizens of Arab states enjoyed under pre-invasion Iraqi law, 
relative to other foreigners.109  This distinction was grounded in the Ba‘thist commitment 
to pan-Arabism.110  Pre-invasion Iraqi law explicitly exempted citizens of Arab states 
from the Foreigners’ Residency Law, which regulates entry, exit, and deportation (though 
their entry could be blocked and they could be imprisoned for any number of offenses).111  
A 1975 law permitted the Interior Minister to exempt any adult Arab from standard 
naturalization requirements.112  Unlike other foreigners, Arabs could be hired for state 
positions with the same duties and privileges as Iraqis.113  They could also join 
professional and trade associations.114 
                                                 
109 Under pre-invasion Iraqi law, a “foreigner” was often defined as someone who was neither Iraqi nor 
Arab [al-ajnabi ghayr al-‘Iraqi wa-ghayr al-‘Arabi].  Qanun al-jinsiyya al-‘Iraqiyya wal-ma‘lumat al-
madaniyya [Law on Iraqi Nationality and Civil Information], Law No. 46 (1990) art. 2(6).  For the 
purposes of this essay, I will use the term “Arab” to refer to citizens of Arab League member states; this 
could include those who do not ethnically self-identify as Arab and would exclude citizens of other 
countries of Arab descent. 
110 See SALIH AL-HASSUN, HUQUQ AL-AJANIB FIL-QANUN AL-‘IRAQI MA‘A ISHARA KHASSA LI-WAD‘ AL-
MUWATIN AL-‘ARAB FI DAW’ FIKR HIZB AL-BA‘TH AL-‘ARABI AL-ISHTIRAKI [THE RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS 
IN IRAQI LAW, WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE SITUATION OF THE ARAB CITIZEN IN LIGHT OF THE THOUGHT 
OF THE ARAB SOCIALIST BA‘TH PARTY] (1981). 
111 Qanun iqamat al-ajanib [Foreigners’ Residency Law], Law No. 118 (1978) art. 2.  Indeed, the most 
important movement control on foreign Arabs in pre-invasion Iraqi law was a provision in this law 
forbidding them from departing the country without permission if they have work contracts or similar 
commitments.  See id. art. 8(1). 
112 Qanun manh al-jinsiyya al-‘Iraqiyya lil-‘Arab [Law on Granting of Iraqi Nationality to Arabs], Law No. 
5 (1975) art. 1.  The provision, which specifically excludes Palestinians, was folded into the later Iraqi 
Nationality Law, Law No. 46 (1990) art. 7. 
113 See Revolutionary Command Council Decision 384 (1972). 
114 See AL-HASSUN, supra note 110, at 246-47. 
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 These laws helped encourage large-scale emigration from the Arab world in the 
1970s and 1980s; according to one conservative estimate, up to 1.25 million Egyptian 
workers alone lived in Iraq in 1990.115  There were also sizeable communities of 
Sudanese, Palestinians, and Syrians.  Although these numbers undoubtedly diminished 
after the 1991 Gulf War and a decade of sanctions, it is safe to say that at least tens of 
thousands of non-Iraqi Arabs remained in the country at the time of the American 
invasion, although no solid figures are available, save for the then 34,000-strong 
Palestinian population.116  The subsequent occupation and civil war, as well as the 
measures described below, have taken their toll on these groups.  As of 2008, one official 
estimated that only five thousand foreign Arab families remained in the country.117 
 Many of the laws favoring Arabs over other foreigners were explicitly justified in 
pan-Arabist terms.  The original 1972 provision exempting Arabs from the law on foreign 
residents referenced “the unity of the Arab nation [umma]” and a desire to end colonial 
practices that “treated Arab citizens as foreigners.”118  The 1975 law permitting the 
exemption of any adult Arab from standard naturalization requirements spoke of the need 
for “unity amongst the Arab people [sha‘b] in all of its lands to remove the artificial 
                                                 
115 See RALPH SELL, GONE FOR GOOD?: EGYPTIAN MIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE ARAB WORLD 31 (1987); 
GIL FEILER, LABOUR MIGRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOLLOWING THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT 15 
(1993). 
116 See PETER BOUCKAERT, BILL FRELICK & CHRISTOPH WILCKE, NOWHERE TO FLEE: THE PERILOUS 
SITUATION OF PALESTINIANS IN IRAQ 8 (Human Rights Watch 2006). 
117 See Mas’ul amn Baghdad lil-Sharq al-Awsat: Hunaka 5 alaf a‘ila ‘Arabiyya . . . wa iqamatuhum sariyat 
al-maf‘ul [Baghdad security official tells al-Sharq al-Awsat: There are five thousand Arab families, and 
their residency is valid], AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Jan. 26, 2008 (quoting official who claims that a “large 
proportion” of the five thousand families have legal residency, whereas an undetermined number are in the 
country illegally). 
118 Eighth Amendment to Foreigners’ Residency Law of 1961, Law No. 99 (1972).  The 1978 Foreigners’ 
Residency Law incorporated this exemption, see supra, note 111.  A 1980 amendment to the same law also 
created a special category of expatriate citizen [al-muwatin al-mughtarib] – people of Arab origin not living 
in any Arab country and without citizenship in any Arab country – with rights to enter the country without 
a visa and to reside in Iraq with a permit.  See Third Amendment to Foreigners’ Residency Law, Law No. 
208 (1980), art. 2. 
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borders fabricated by the colonizer.”119  These laws, of course, do not mean that pre-
invasion Iraq was a borderless pan-Arab utopia: foreign Arab residents were, after all, as 
vulnerable to Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus as ordinary Iraqis.  Rather, the point 
here is simply to note that these relatively liberal naturalization and residency provisions, 
even if not widely respected, at least signaled an orientation that did not automatically 
regard expulsion as the obvious way of dealing with foreigners. 
 This expressed ideological commitment to pan-Arabism was tied to at least three 
other factors: First, geopolitically, Iraq and Syria competed for the mantle of pan-Arab 
leadership, especially after the 1978 Camp David accords placed Egypt firmly in the U.S. 
orbit.120  Second, the Iraqi economy experienced a massive demand for foreign labor 
driven by the oil industry and war with Iran,121 providing additional rationales for such 
laws.122  Third, the commitment to pan-Arabism in Iraq cannot be properly understood 
apart from the history of modern Iraqi nationalism – as the historian Eric Davis has 
argued, pan-Arabism provided a secular basis for national identity that simultaneously 
appealed specifically to the Ba‘th regime’s most important political constituency, the 
minority Sunni Arab population.123 
 In analyzing the collision between pre-invasion Iraq’s pan-Arabist laws and the 
U.S.-driven imperatives of policing out-of-place Muslims, this essay uses debates over 
                                                 
119 Law on Granting of Iraqi Nationality to Arabs, supra note 112, art. 1. 
120 See MALIK MUFTI, SOVEREIGN CREATIONS: PAN-ARABISM AND THE POLITICAL ORDER IN SYRIA AND 
IRAQ (1996); EBERHARD KIENLE, BA‘ATH V. BA‘ATH: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ 1968-
1989 (1990). 
121 See KADHIM AL-EYD, OIL REVENUES AND ACCELERATED GROWTH: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY IN IRAQ 
115-16 (1979). 
122 Unlike similarly labor-hungry neighbors such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates who have relied 
more extensively on South and Southeast Asian as labor suppliers, Iraq appears to have maintained an 
overall preference for Arab workers.  See ELIYAHU KANOVSKY, MIGRATION FROM THE POOR TO THE RICH 
ARAB COUNTRIES 34 (1984). 




the laws of war (also called international humanitarian law) as a prism.  The laws of war 
raise two important differences vis-à-vis this essay’s other case study, postwar Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  First, whereas the U.S. could essentially write its own rules for operating 
in post-conflict BiH (the Dayton Accord), the laws of war presented serious textual 
constraints that U.S. officials in Iraq had to go to extraordinary interpretive lengths to 
argue around.  Second, while the overall Dayton framework has remained relatively 
static, the law of war regime in Iraq has not: The situation has shifted from occupation to 
civil war, the latter being far less explicitly regulated by the laws of war.  Accordingly, 
the U.S. has transformed its formal status from that of an occupying power to a mere 
provider of assistance to the putatively sovereign Iraqi government.  Taken together, and 
unlike in BiH, the laws of war in Iraq thus presented shifting pressures and opportunities 
as the U.S. attempted to pursue out-of-place Muslims while also preserving the immunity 
of its own personnel. 
 
A. Exclusion: From Neutrals to Aliens 
Iraq has in U.S. public rhetoric been the ground zero of concern over foreign fighters.  
Since 2003, U.S. forces’ campaign against “foreign fighters” has led to the removal of 
hundreds of non-Iraqis for detention in other countries, apparently with little or no legal 
process.  Yet there is relatively little124 public information available about how this took 
                                                 
124 The two best-documented major routes in the U.S. global detention regime are, of course, transfers from 
Afghanistan/Pakistan to Guantánamo and renditions from Europe.  The relative lack of information about 
transfers from Iraq may be due to the fact that flights to Afghanistan (the destination for most documented 
cases of transfer from Iraq) do not have to stop for refueling in Europe.  The paper trail left at European 
airports and political will in the EU have been major factors in the exposure of CIA rendition operations in 
that part of the world.  See, e.g., Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Comm. on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member 
States: second report, Doc. 11302 rev. (June 11, 2007) (rapporteur Dick Marty); European Parliament, 
Temporary Comm. on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal 
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place or the legal rationales relied upon.  What is clear is that the obstacles posed by the 
laws of war to the logic of exclusion have relaxed over time. 
 When the U.S. first conquered Iraq, it accepted that it was bound by the laws of 
war regulating occupations, including the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1907 
Hague Regulations.125  The Convention protects civilians in occupied territories, 
including citizens of neutral states.126  The law of occupation works at cross-purposes 
with the logic of exclusion in two ways.  First, the Convention absolutely prohibits 
“[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from 
occupied territory . . . regardless of motive.”127  The prohibition was unanimously 
adopted by the Convention’s authors and is “absolute and allows of no exceptions” apart 
                                                                                                                                                 
Detention of Prisoners, Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation 
and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, A6-0020/2007 (Jan. 30, 2007) (rapporteur Giovanni Fava). 
125 See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (“recognizing the specific authorities, 
responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of [the U.S. and U.K.] as occupying 
powers . . .”); see also id. ¶ 5 (calling upon “all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under 
international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 
1907”).  
126 The Convention protects “those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find 
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power 
of which they are not nationals,” but excludes neutrals “in the territory of a belligerent state.”  Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].  The term “belligerent state” is widely 
read to mean only the sovereign domestic territory of a state at war.  See, e.g., JEAN PICTET, OSCAR UHLER 
& HENRI COURSIER, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949: COMMENTARY, VOL 4: GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR [hereinafter PICTET COMMENTARY] 
47 (1958) (“there are two main classes of protected person: (1) ‘enemy nationals’ within the national 
territory of each of the Parties to the conflict and (2) ‘the whole population’ of occupied territories . . .”).  
This reading is supported by language elsewhere in the Convention that posits “belligerent” and “occupied” 
as mutually exclusive categories.  See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra, art. 11 (“The provisions of this 
Article shall extend and be adapted to cases of nationals of a neutral State who are in occupied territory or 
who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State . . .”).  Nationals of the occupying state and its co-
belligerents are excluded.  See id. art. 4. 
127 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 126, art. 49(1). 
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from those provided in the Convention itself.128  Such deportations are not merely 
violations of treaty obligations, they are also war crimes.129 
 Second, Occupying Powers must preserve and enforce pre-existing local law 
unless “absolutely prevented” from doing so.130  This rule would favor respecting pre-
invasion Iraqi law’s exemption of foreign Arabs from provisions governing residency 
requirements and deportation.131  The scope of this obligation, however, has never been 
clear, especially when balanced against the right of Occupying Powers to take certain 
necessary security measures regarding protected persons.132 
 U.S. authorities moved quickly to alter the status of foreigners in Iraq other than 
themselves and their allies.  On June 27, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
promulgated a new set of entry requirements that effectively revoked the longstanding 
visa waiver for citizens of Arab states and enabled the deportation of foreign Arabs 
violating the order.133  By October, the Iraqi Interior Ministry was reportedly issuing 
directives requiring foreign Arabs already in the country to obtain new residency 
documents or risk deportation.134 
                                                 
128 PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 126, at 278. 
129 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 126, art. 147 (Grave breaches include “unlawful deportation 
or transfer . . . of a protected person”).  Grave breaches are criminalized under U.S. law by 18 U.S.C. § 
2441(c)(1). 
130 See Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
131 See supra Part III. 
132 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 126, art. 27(4).  For more on the scope of the Occupying 
Power’s duty to preserve local laws, see Yoram Dinstein, Legislation Under Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding (Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and 
Conflict Research, Occasional Paper No. 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/pdfs/OccasionalPaper1.pdf. 
133 See Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Order No. 16, Temporary Control of Iraqi Borders, Ports 
and Airports, §§ 3, 4, 5, 8 (entered into force June 27, 2003), available at 
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/ia/docs/CPAORD16iraqi_borders.pdf.  For a fuller analysis of this order, see 
David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of War and 
Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 330-34 (2007). 
134 See Imhal al-‘Arab al-muqimin fil-‘Iraq usbu‘ayn idafiyayn li-tathbit iqamatihim [Two-Week Extension 
for Arab Residents to Confirm Their Residency], AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Nov. 12, 2003; Al-Dakhiliyya al-
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 While CPA administrators were broadly finding ways to monitor and police out-
of-place Muslims, their military and intelligence counterparts began shipping some of 
them to detention overseas.  The CIA reportedly sought authority to secretly remove non-
Iraqis from the country as early as April 2003.135  Estimates on such transfers during the 
period of direct occupation are difficult, given instructions issued to military authorities 
not to register certain detainees so that they could be removed from the country by the 
CIA.136  Up to one hundred so-called “ghost detainees” were held in Iraq before 
September 2004, hidden from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and 
never registered.137  At the lower end of estimates is one press report estimating that the 
CIA transported a dozen non-Iraqis out of the country in 2003 and 2004.138  It is unclear 
how many ghost detainees were transferred out of the country or if other foreign 
prisoners were transferred even if registered. 
 Because the issue of transfers from Iraq has received little specific attention, I 
have collected and summarized here the seven individual cases I was able to find from 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Iraqiyya tafhas milaffat al-‘Arab al-muqimin fil-‘Iraq wa ijra’at li-akhdh basamatihim [Iraqi Interior 
Ministry to Check Files or Arab Residents in Iraq and Take Measures to Fingerprint Them], AL-SABIL 
(Amman), Nov. 4, 2003; Al-Kharijiyya al-‘Iraqiyya tumahhil al-‘Arab 15 yawm lil-husul ‘ala al-iqama 
[Iraqi Foreign Ministry Gives Arabs 15 Days to Obtain Residency], AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Oct. 8, 2003. 
135 See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Action Bars Rights of Some Captured in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A1.  
The segregation of foreign from Iraqi detainees began during the “major combat operations” phase of the 
invasion, when U.S. forces separated foreign nationals from Iraqi Prisoners of War if they were carrying 
concealed weapons and not wearing uniforms, holding at least two hundred such individuals in May 2003.  
See Kathleen Rhem, Coalition Holds 2,000 Prisoners in Umm Qasr; 7,000 others released, AMERICAN 
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, May 8, 2003. 
136 Lt. Col. Steven Jordan, director of the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center at Abu Ghraib, told Army 
investigators of an informal agreement between his superior and “Other Government Agencies” (OGA, a 
euphemism for the CIA) to hold some detainees without standard screening, fingerprinting, and registration 
procedures.  “The OGA folks wanted to be able to pull somebody in 24, 48, 72 hours if they had to get ‘em 
to [Guantánamo], do what have you.”  Taguba Report, supra note 4, Annex 53, pp. 132-33.  While there is 
no record of transfers from Abu Ghraib to Guantánamo, Jordan seems to have been under the impression 
that the non-registration of detainees was linked to the possibility of transfer abroad. 
137 See The Investigation of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq: Hearing 
Before the S. Armed Serv. Comm., 108th Cong., S. Hrg. 108-68 at 1061 (2004) (testimony of Gen. Paul 
Kern). 
138 See Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1. 
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publicly available sources, all involving Arab Muslims transferred from Iraq in 2003-
2004 without any charge or apparent legal process: 
• The most detailed account relates to the January 2004 detention of Yemeni citizen 
Khaled al-Maqtari in Fallujah.  After nine days of torture, including at Abu 
Ghraib, Maqtari was transported to Afghanistan and held there for three months 
before being sent to a “black site” in an unknown country, most likely in eastern 
Europe.  Al-Maqtari was later transferred to Yemeni custody in September 2006, 
and finally released in May 2007.139 
• In January 2004, Kurdish forces seized an unnamed Jordanian man, who was held 
for 38 days by U.S. forces in Baghdad before being repatriated to Jordan and 
detained by secret police there.140 
• On January 26, 2004, President George W. Bush announced the capture of an 
individual named Hassan Ghul in northern Iraq, alleging him to be a senior al-
Qa‘ida operative.141  Ghul was apparently held in CIA custody142 for two years, 
before being transferred to further detention in Pakistan.143 
• In February 2004, U.K. commandos captured two men in the Baghdad area 
believed to be Pakistanis and handed them over to U.S. forces, who subsequently 
transferred them to Afghanistan, where they remain in custody.  They were 
                                                 
139 The case is extensively documented in A CASE TO ANSWER: FROM ABU GHRAIB TO SECRET CIA 
CUSTODY: THE CASE OF KHALED AL-MAQTARI (Amnesty International 2008).  
140 MARINER, supra note 35, at 28-29. 
141 President George W. Bush, Remarks at Little Rock, Arkansas (Jan. 26, 2004). 
142 See Bradbury Memorandum, supra note 34, at 7 (“The interrogation team ‘carefully analyzed Gul’s 
responsiveness to different areas of inquiry’ during this time . . .”) (quoting Aug. 25, 2004 letter from CIA 
Assoc. Gen. Counsel to Daniel Levin, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel). 
143 Rangzieb Ahmed, a UK national detained and allegedly tortured in Pakistan, says he met Ghul in a 
prison in Pakistan in January 2007 and believed him to be a Pakistani citizen.  See Testimony of Rangzieb 
Ahmed to Cageprisoners 14, http://www.cageprisoners.com/downloads/RangziebAhmed.pdf. 
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allegedly members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, an armed group operating in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Kashmir.144 
• In April 2004, a Saudi detainee known as “Abu ‘Abd Allah” was reportedly 
transferred from Iraq to the CIA detention facility in Afghanistan where Khaled 
al-Maqtari was being held.145 
• An unnamed Tunisian fighter was also reportedly captured by Kurdish forces and 
sent to Jordan for detention sometime in 2003 or 2004.146 
 The exact legal basis for some of these transfers has never been officially 
disclosed.  What is apparent, however, is that by the autumn of 2003 a distinction 
between locals and foreigners tended to arise in general GWOT detention policy, with 
transfer to detention abroad primarily, if not exclusively, reserved for the latter.  This 
appears consistent with pre-2001 policies focusing on out-of-place Muslims.  The last 
known significant transfer of Afghan detainees to Guantánamo was on November 23, 
2003147; after that point, extraterritorial removal of Muslim detainees from their own 
countries by the U.S. appears to have been very rare. 
 The question of whether local and foreign detainees were to be treated alike – as 
they effectively were in Afghanistan – appears to have been brought to a head by the 
transfer of an Iraqi detainee, named in media reports as Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul, 
from Iraq to CIA detention in Afghanistan in the summer of 2003.  According to Jack 
Goldsmith, then head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the U.S. Department of 
Justice and now a professor at Harvard Law School, there was a consensus by October 
                                                 
144 See 488 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2009) 395-97 (statement by Defence Secretary John Hutton). 
145 See A CASE TO ANSWER, supra note 139, at 23. 
146 See MARINER, supra note 35, at 28-29. 
147 THE “JOURNEY OF DEATH”: OVER 700 PRISONERS ILLEGALLY RENDERED TO GUANTANAMO WITH THE 
HELP OF PORTUGAL 29 (Reprieve 2008). 
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among lawyers across the government that the Geneva Conventions applied to Iraqi 
insurgents but not to foreign “terrorists” who entered the country after the invasion.  
Goldsmith claims he issued a one-page interim ruling that non-Iraqis who were not 
members of the Ba‘th party and had come to the country after the invasion were not 
covered by the Conventions and therefore could be transferred, but that Iraqis could 
not.148  According to press reports, the CIA accordingly returned Rashul to Iraq, where he 
was subsequently held as an unregistered “ghost detainee.”149  Rashul’s fate remains 
unknown. 
 The reasoning behind Goldsmith’s October 2003 interim decision that non-Iraqis 
could be excluded from the Geneva Conventions is not publicly known, but is likely akin 
to that contained in a legal opinion establishing the administration’s official position, 
signed by Goldsmith on March 18, 2004.150  This memorandum – made public only in the 
                                                 
148 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
39-42 (2007). 
149 See Edward Pound, Iraq’s Invisible Man, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28, 2004, at 32 (quoting a 
directive from Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), that 
“Notification of the presence and or status of the detainee to the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
or any international or national aid organization, is prohibited pending further guidance.”). 
150 Goldsmith’s memorandum should not be confused with a draft memorandum dated March 19, 2004 and 
leaked several months later.  That draft opinion argued that even foreigners who are protected by the 
Fourth Geneva Convention can be expelled from occupied territories if they are otherwise deportable under 
local immigration law.  See Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel 
on Permissibility of Relocating Certain “Protected Persons” from Occupied Iraq to Alberto Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President (Mar. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Goldsmith Draft Memorandum].  Goldsmith’s draft 
memorandum is narrower than the position ultimately adopted insofar as it argues that protected persons 
retain their protections even if expelled, id. at 14, whereas his formal opinion denies certain individuals 
protected status altogether. 
 Although less sweeping, the draft memorandum is nevertheless deeply flawed in its interpretation of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention’s absolute prohibition on deportations from occupied territory.  It reasons 
that expulsions of foreigners are not “deportations” within the sense of the Convention, citing putative 
Roman law definitions restricting the term only to citizens or permanent residents.  Goldsmith’s reasoning 
and sourcing have been ably dissected elsewhere.  See Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 133, at 321-42; 
Leila Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 5/6, 1200, 1226-38 (2007). 
 Goldsmith has claimed that the draft was never finalized and never relied upon to remove anyone from 
Iraq.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 148, at 172.  If this is true, it is nevertheless misleading, insofar as the 
opinion officially adopted by Goldsmith is far more sweeping.  The true significance of the draft 
memorandum likely lies in its second argument, namely that the U.S. can remove even some Iraqi civilians 
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final days of the Bush administration – argued that people “who are not Iraqi nationals or 
permanent residents of Iraq” should receive no protection under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention if they are members of any group found to be “engaged in global armed 
conflict against the United States,” regardless of whether they are connected to al-Qa‘ida 
or the September 2001 attacks.151  Consequently, such individuals would receive no 
protections under the laws of war whatsoever, pursuant to Bush’s previous determination 
that alleged al-Qa‘ida operatives were not entitled to the protections of the laws of war.152 
 Goldsmith’s memorandum finds that the object and purpose of the Geneva 
Conventions, as analyzed by his predecessor Jay Bybee (now a judge on the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals) with regard to Afghanistan,153 militate in favor of excluding members 
of non-state groups “who engage in transnational armed conflict” from any protection 
under the laws of war.154  Goldsmith’s only significant departure from the Bybee 
framework used in Afghanistan lies in his attempt to distinguish between Iraqis and 
foreigners.  Goldsmith begins from the definition of protected persons in article 4 of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
“for a brief but not indefinite period, to facilitate interrogation.”  Goldsmith Draft Memorandum, supra, at 
14.  This argument would retroactively legalize Rashul’s transfer to Afghanistan as “temporary,” thus 
absolving the officials involved of possible criminal liability. 
  Because the draft memorandum is narrower than the position ultimately adopted, it is also possible 
that Goldsmith prepared it as an alternative in an attempt to rein in Bush administration detention policies.  
In the absence of an independent investigation, however, this remains speculative.  Goldsmith himself has 
publicly opposed any new inquiries that could shed additional light on the matter.  See Jack Goldsmith, No 
New Torture Probes, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2008, at A13. 
151 Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel on “Protected Person” 
Status in Occupied Iraq Under the Fourth Geneva Convention to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President 23, 14 n.18 (Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Goldsmith Memorandum]. 
152 See Memorandum from George W. Bush on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 
(Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Memorandum]. 
153 See Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 151, at 18 (quoting Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Ass’t 
Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel on Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Jan. 22, 2002)).  In Afghanistan, Bush agreed that 
the Geneva Conventions generally applied – or rather he “decline[d] to exercise” his purported “authority 
under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan.”  Bush 
Memorandum, supra note 152, at 1-2.  In any event, the relatively rapid installation of the Karzai regime 
and its ensuing international recognition enabled the U.S. to largely avoid questions concerning the 
application of the law of occupation, including the relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
154 Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 151, at 16-17. 
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Fourth Geneva Convention, namely those who “at a given moment and in any manner 
whatsoever, find themselves in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of 
which they are not nationals.”  Goldsmith concedes that the text of the Convention 
unambiguously protects citizens and permanent residents of Iraqi who are members of al-
Qa‘ida.155  He argues, however, that the phrase “find themselves” is ambiguous and could 
be read to connote happenstance or lack of volition, thus excluding travelers and other 
foreigners who are not permanent residents.156  In order to interpret this purported 
ambiguity, Goldsmith turns to the interpretive framework for the laws of war developed 
by Bybee, and finds that such foreigners fall outside the Convention altogether. 
 Goldsmith’s analysis is based on a strained attempt to impute textual ambiguity to 
article 4’s use of the phrase “find themselves”: “While ‘are’ may be a possible reading of 
‘find themselves,’ it is not the only, or even a particularly obvious, reading of that 
phrase.”157  There are three major problems with this analysis.  First, it is highly doubtful 
as to whether the text is ambiguous in the manner Goldsmith suggests, since the attempt 
to accord special meaning to the phrase “find themselves” is not supported by the plain 
language of the French text of the Convention, which is equally authoritative to the 
English version.158  The phrase “find themselves” in article 4 corresponds to se trouvent 
in the French text, a reflexive use of the verb “to find” often translated simply as “to be” 
in English.  There are over twenty uses of the verb se trouver in the Convention which 
                                                 
155 See id. at 23.  Goldsmith also correctly concedes that the Convention generally protects citizens of 
neutral states within occupied territories.  See id. at 9-10. 
156 Id. at 14. 
157 Id. 
158 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 126, art. 150; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 33(3), Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (“The terms of the treaty are presumed 
to have the same meaning in each authentic text.”). 
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are rendered in the English as some variant of the verb “to be”159 – only twice is it 
translated as “find themselves” or some variant thereof.160  Goldsmith’s attempt to invest 
the term “find themselves” with distinct meaning would thus make no sense in light of 
the French text, which clearly treats it as interchangeable with the verb “to be.” 
 Second, Goldsmith’s analysis of relevant authority is highly selective.  His only 
support for reading ambiguity in the phrase “find themselves” is dicta contained in a 
concurrence in an Israeli High Court of Justice decision that did not consider the issue (a 
reading rejected by the majority) and unsupported speculation in a single law review 
article footnote.161  At the same time, Goldsmith’s extensive search for interpretive 
guidance as to the alleged ambiguity ignores entirely the ICRC’s Commentary on the 
provision: 
The words “at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever,” [in art. 4] were intended 
to ensure that all situations and cases were covered.  The Article refers both to people 
who were in the territory before the outbreak of war (or the beginning of the occupation) 
and to those who go or are taken there as a result of circumstances: travellers, tourists, 
people who have been shipwrecked and even, it may be, spies or saboteurs.162 
 
This interpretation is clearly at odds with Goldsmith’s attempt to exclude visitors and 
newly arrived foreigners from the scope of “find themselves” in an occupied territory in 
the sense of article 4.  Elsewhere in the memorandum, Goldsmith quotes from a 
                                                 
159 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 126, arts. 11(5), 11(7), 25(1), 27(3), 29, 30, 37, 39(1), 40(1), 
41(1), 42, 47, 51(3), 52(1), 62, 93(2), 98(3), 99(2), 101(1), 104(3), 126, 136(1), 143(1). 
160 Id. arts. 4, 11(7). 
161 Goldsmith cites Affo v. Commander Israel Defense Force in the West Bank, 29 I.L.M. 139, 180 (1990) 
(Bach, J., concurring in judgment) and Brian Farrell, Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses as a Punitive 
Measure: Application of International Law to Regulation 119, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 871, 922 n.384 (2003).  
See Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 151, at 15. 
162 PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 126, at 47 (emphasis added).  Instead of dealing with this text, 
Goldsmith argues that the expression absolute language of “in any manner whatsoever” “does not inform or 
expand, but instead depends upon and is limited by,” Goldsmith’s idiosyncratic reading of the expression 
“find themselves.”  Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 151, at 15. 
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neighboring provision on the same page of the ICRC Commentary, strongly suggesting 
that his failure to engage with this text was avoidance and not oversight.163 
 Third, Goldsmith’s voluntarist interpretation of the phrase “find themselves” as 
connoting a “lack of deliberate action”164 simply does not mesh with his other key 
contention, that the Convention’s object and purpose is to protect citizens and permanent 
residents.  If Goldsmith’s textual interpretation is taken seriously, then it could also 
exclude from protection anyone who voluntarily traveled to Iraq after the beginning of 
the occupation, even Iraqi exiles returning to work for the U.S., to say nothing of civilian 
aid workers and journalists from neutral countries.  Moreover, because the phrase “finds 
themselves” describes not only people in occupied territory but also individuals in the 
sovereign territory of a state with which their governments are at war, Goldsmith’s 
reading would have allowed Saddam Husayn’s regime to exclude, for example, American 
journalists arriving in Iraq during the war. 
 Although the full story of how policy on extraterritorial transfers and detention 
has yet to be told, two things are clear from the Goldsmith memorandum: First, it 
embodies the logic of exclusion by seeking to distinguish between local and out-of-place 
Muslims, reflecting what Goldsmith claims was a consensus across the U.S. government.  
Second, this exclusion of out-of-place Muslims from the protection of occupation law set 
the stage for what happened after the end of the formal occupation. 
 Insofar as Iraq putatively resumed its status as a sovereign independent state on 
June 29, 2004, the laws of war no longer expressly forbade the deportation of foreigners 
by the U.S.  The U.S. occupation of Iraq formally ended and hostilities in the country 
                                                 
163 See Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 151, at 5 (“The expression ‘in the hands of’ is used in an 
extremely general sense.”). 
164 Id., at 14. 
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were now considered to be a non-international armed conflict (civil war), in which the 
U.S. was participating not as a foreign invader but as an invited guest of the sovereign 
Iraqi state.165  The treaty law of non-international armed conflict is considerably thinner 
than occupation law.  It contains no equivalent prohibition on deportations166; similarly, 
the requirement to preserve local law unless absolutely prevented from doing so 
evaporates.  In short, whereas most out-of-place Muslims would be protected as neutrals 
under the law of occupation, in non-international armed conflict they have no special 
status and are mere aliens under domestic law, which itself can now be more easily 
rewritten.  This paved the way for more expulsions without the need for elaborate legal 
justifications as far as the laws of war are concerned. 
 As the Iraqi civil war intensified, efforts against out-of-place Muslims intensified.  
In March 2005, media reports began to spread of large-scale round-ups and interrogations 
of hundreds of foreign Arabs.  Under new Interior Ministry regulations, foreign residents 
had to obtain new residency papers in order to avoid deportation, which in turn required a 
                                                 
165 This position has gained acceptance from the UN Security Council.  See S.C. Res. 1637 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1637 (Nov. 8, 2005) (“. . . the presence of the multinational force in Iraq is at the request of the 
Government of Iraq . . .”).  It has also been accepted by the ICRC.  See  Press Release, ICRC, Iraq Post 28 
June 2004: Protecting Persons Deprived of Freedom Remains a Priority (Aug. 5, 2004) (ICRC “no longer 
considers the situation in Iraq to be that of an international armed conflict between the US-led coalition and 
the state of Iraq and covered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in their entirety . . .”).  Some scholars 
have suggested that the situation should still be considered an occupation, as long as MNF-I retains de facto 
authority over Iraqi forces.  See, e.g., Zouhair Al Hassani, International Humanitarian Law and its 
Implementation in Iraq, INT’L REV. RED CROSS, Mar. 2008, at 51 (2008).  For more on the civil wars 
conducted with the participation of external state parties, see Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized Non-
International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AM. UNIV. L. R. 
145 (1983). 
166 The closest equivalent is found in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which 
criminalizes “[o]rdering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to [a non-
international armed] conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so 
demand.”  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(e)(viii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90.  This is more permissive than the rule in occupations, which prohibits individual as well as mass 
transfers.  See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 126, art. 49.  This provision of the Rome Statute also 
omits the limitations and safeguards on evacuations required in occupations, such as the right of evacuees 
to be able to return “as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased” and requirements that 
Occupying Powers strive to provide basic accommodations to evacuees.  Id. 
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valid Iraqi visa, a valid foreign passport, and according to some reports, a work 
contract.167  For long-term Arab residents, who never needed Iraqi visas in the first place 
and some of whom no longer had valid passports, the new regulations left them in a 
particularly vulnerable position.  “Sometimes we take [foreigners without proper 
documentation] direct from our office to the border if he is found to be suspect and his 
family will follow him later,” a senior interior ministry official said.168  In one of the most 
significant repudiations of Iraq’s pan-Arabist laws, the Presidency Council in 2006 
promulgated a new nationality law that erased the special status of Arabs and 
retroactively revoked citizenships granted to Arabs under the 1978 law except in cases 
where this would lead to statelessness.169 
 These measures were accompanied by a series of stern official statements.  As one 
unnamed Interior Ministry official put it, “The time for dillydallying [al-‘abth] has 
passed.  The state has a new political direction.  It has now decided that he who doesn't 
serve Iraq must leave, must not enter, and must not stay.”170   One journalist characterized 
a spreading fear of foreign Arabs amongst some Baghdad residents thus: 
                                                 
167 See Alissa Rubin, Iraq Moves to Expel Foreign Arabs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A1.  The exact 
nature of these provisions and their relationship with the regulations reported in 2003 are unclear, as the 
regulations have not been published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, posted on Iraqi government websites, or 
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 According to one report, anyone who does not fulfill the entry visa requirements of the Foreigners’ 
Residency Law art. 5(2) can be expelled.  See Usama Mahdi, Nafi tarhil ‘Arab Baghdad [Expulsion of 
Baghdad Arabs Denied], ELAPH.COM, Mar. 22, 2005, http://www.elaph.com/Politics/2005/3/49773.htm.  
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168 Iraq: Focus on Treatment of Foreign Arabs, UN INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK, June 
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Saudis and Egyptians, and about 250 people have been asked to leave.”).  But see Mahdi, supra note 167 
(“Iraqi authorities have affirmed that no Arab resident has been deported from their territory . . .”). 
169 Qanun al-jinsiyya al-‘Iraqiyya [Iraqi Nationality Law], Law No. 26 (2006) art. 21(2). 
170 Walid Ibrahim, Al-Hukuma al-‘Iraqiyya satattikhdh ijra’at bi-haqq al-muqimin ghayr al-shar‘iyyin fil-
bilad [The Iraqi Government Will Take Measures Against Illegal Residents in the Country], ASWAT AL-
‘IRAQ (Baghdad), Feb. 23, 2005.  See also Bassem Mroue, Anger at Foreign Arabs Builds in Iraq, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 19, 2007 (describing government-sponsored television ads featuring depictions of 
men with Egyptian accents to encourage Iraqis to report suspicious activity by foreign Arabs). 
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The presence of Arabs has turned into a source of concern anywhere in Baghdad.  For 
once an inhabitant comes to know that someone present in the neighborhood is Egyptian 
or Palestinian or Syrian or Jordanian, caution and circumspection overtake him: [The 
person] could be a leader of an armed group, or even Zarqawi’s right-hand man.171 
 
The Arabic media also featured numerous stories about the fear and outrage amongst 
long-term Arab residents over how the campaigns had turned them overnight “from 
guests to suspects.”172  While a full evaluation of the relations and attitudes across Iraqi 
society towards Arabs is beyond the scope of this paper, the U.S. concern over foreign 
fighters clearly dovetailed with Iraqi political dynamics, be they sectarian interests – 
since most foreign fighters were presumed to be Sunni173 – or grievances stemming from 
the previous regime’s perceived favoritism towards Arabs, especially Palestinians.174 
 It appears that the reclassification of the situation from occupation to civil war 
paved the way for accelerating transfers of foreigners from Iraq.  Without the restrictions 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, transfers no longer required the kind of elaborate 
attempts to circumvent the laws of war such as those found in the Goldsmith memoranda.  
Between 2006 and August 2008, the U.S. military reportedly transferred 214 non-Iraqi 
prisoners to the intelligence services of client states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt with 
little or no attention and without Iraqi approval.  Under this program, detainees could be 
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173 In one particularly virulent exchange, deputies from the governing (and Shi‘i dominated) United Iraqi 
Alliance called for the expulsion of foreign Arabs from Iraq, causing Parliamentary speaker (and prominent 
Sunni politician) Mahmud al-Mashhadani to retort that the expulsion should encompass both “Arabs and 
non-Arabs” – a clear reference to the Alliance’s Iranian allies.  Nuwwab al-I’tilaf yutalibun bi-tarhil al-
‘Arab wal-Mashhadani yutalib bi-tarhil al-Iraniyyin . . . usbu‘ al-alaf qatil fil-‘Iraq [Alliance Deputies 
Demand Expulsion of Arabs, and al-Mashhadani Demands Expulsion of Iranians . . . a Week of Thousands 
Killed in Iraq], AL-HAYAT (London), Feb. 5, 2007, at 1. 
174 See BOUCKAERT, FRELICK & WILCKE, supra note 116, at 9-10 (describing pre-invasion mandatory rent 
control provisions for Palestinians that “in effect, deprived” Iraqi landlords of their property).  
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held in secret for two weeks (with extensions possible) at a special operations camp in 
Balad, north of Baghdad, before transfer to custody in another country.175  In June 2008, 
the commander of detainee operations in Iraq, Marine Maj. Gen. Douglas Stone, publicly 
acknowledged the existence of the program, claiming that non-Iraqi detainees are 
repatriated in cooperation with the ICRC.176  There appears to be almost no independent 
information available at this time about the treatment, fate, or identity of these detainees. 
 The legal basis for these transfers has not been publicly disclosed,177 but what is 
significant here is that as far as the laws of war are concerned (as opposed to obligations 
under international human rights or domestic laws), they are less likely to be problematic 
than those from before July 2004.   As long as the sovereign Iraqi government has 
directly or indirectly authorized these transfers, they are arguably bilateral (or trilateral, 
given the U.S. role) matters not regulated by the laws of war.  And whatever the legal 
basis, the logic of the policy is entirely consistent with a desire to put out-of-place 
Muslims back into place.178  As Henry Crumpton, former U.S. State Department 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, put it: “All of us in the discussion agreed that 
                                                 
175 See Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, Military Sending Foreign Fighters to Home Nations, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 27, 2008, at A1. 
176 Press conference with Maj. Gen. Douglas Stone, Commander, Detainee Operations, MNF-I, June 1, 
2008.  U.S. military detention operations in Iraq are organized by Task Force 134 (TF-134).  For more on 
the relationship between TF-134 and the Iraqi criminal justice system, see James Annexstad, The Detention 
and Prosecution of Insurgents and Other Non-Traditional Combatants – A Look at the Task Force 134 
Process and the Future of Detainee Prosecutions, 2007 ARMY LAW. 72. 
177 One possible basis for these determinations is the Memorandum of Understanding between MNF-I and 
the Iraqi Interim Government “concerning the handling of High Value Detainees,” referred to in CPA 
Provisional Order No. 99, Joint Detainee Committee § 4 (entered into force June 27, 2004), available at 
http://iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_99_Joint_Detainee_Committee.pdf.  U.S. 
authorities have refused requests to disclose this memorandum.  See BEYOND ABU GHRAIB: DETENTION 
AND TORTURE IN IRAQ 39 (Amnesty International 2006). 
178 Extra-territorial transfer is not the only means used to deal with out-of-place Muslims, of course.  
According to statements issued by MNF-I, at least 132 foreigners, mostly Arabs alleged to be “foreign 
fighters,” were convicted in the Iraqi Central Criminal Court for a variety of offenses between December 
2005 and July 2007.  See also Ma‘ad Fayyad, Asharq Al-Awsat Goes Inside Fort Suse, AL-SHARQ AL-




Guantánamo was not working for lots of reasons and that the simplest way to proceed is 
that when you have foreign fighters captured you send them back home. . . . If you don’t 
send them to Gitmo, and the C.I.A. doesn’t want them, then where do you put them?”179 
 
B. Exemption: Occupation or Assisted Sovereignty? 
Although much has been written about the failure of the U.S. to hold its own personnel or 
private contractors accountable for crimes committed in Iraq,180 less attention has been 
paid to the exemption of such individuals from local legal process.  The logic of 
exemption in Iraq, however, differs from the logic of exclusion for out-of-place Muslims 
described above: In the shift from occupation to civil war, exclusion becomes more, 
rather than less, difficult to justify.  On the one hand, the law of occupation is generally 
held to exempt Occupying Powers from the jurisdiction of local courts, instead relying on 
self-regulation or horizontal accountability amongst the community of states.  On the 
other hand, the law of non-international armed conflict presupposes the creation of a 
sovereign Iraqi state, yet the logic of exemption threatens that same sovereignty: If a state 
cannot punish criminals in its territory, especially foreigners, then how can it claim to be 
sovereign?  The oft-heard American slogan for its role in the state-building project in Iraq 
– “As Iraqi troops stand up, the U.S. will stand down” – begs the inevitable question: 
How long should Iraqi justice stand back? 
                                                 
179 Mazzetti & Schmitt, supra note 175. 
180 See, e.g., SCOTT HORTON, KEVIN LANIGAN & MICHAEL MCCLINTOCK, PRIVATE SECURITY 
CONTRACTORS AT WAR: ENDING THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 15-32 (Human Rights First 2008); Peter 
Singer, Wars, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 534-41 (2004); Kateryna Rakowsky, Military Contractors & Civil Liability: 
Use of the Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq & Afghanistan, 2 
STAN. J. OF CIV. RTS & CIV. LIBERTIES 111, 117-22 (2006). 
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 In the early days of the occupation (and on the day before revoking the visa 
waiver for Arab nationals), CPA head L. Paul Bremer promulgated CPA Order 17, 
granting coalition forces and their contractors and sub-contractors complete immunity 
from Iraqi legal process.181  The decree’s preamble recalled “that under international law, 
occupying powers . . . are not subject to the laws or jurisdiction of the occupied territory.”  
Although the customary international rule on local immunity for occupying armies and 
their civilian components is indeed well-established,182 the extension of immunity to 
civilians working under contract with these forces (as opposed to those under their 
command) has less precedent to rely upon.  This has led to the oft-noticed accountability 
gap for contractors – exempt from Iraqi law and not governed by the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) either until very recently.183 
 The general principle of exemption follows from occupation law’s premise that 
the social contract normally presumed to exist between a population and its government 
has been interrupted by forcible subjugation of the territory by a belligerent army.  
Because modern international law forbids annexation of territory by force, the Occupying 
                                                 
181 The Order granted immunity to the CPA, Coalition Forces, and Foreign Liaison Missions, as well as 
their property, funds, and assets.  See Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 17, Status of the 
Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their Personnel and Contractors, §§ 2.1, 2.4 (entered into force June 
26, 2003), available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/ia/docs/CPAORD17foriegn_mission_liaisons.pdf.  
Contractors were granted immunity for acts performed as part of their official duties; for other acts, any 
legal process against them still required the written permission of the CPA Administrator.  See id. § 3. 
182 See UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 11.26 (2004); 
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT 
THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL ¶ 12.22 (2001); U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 374 (1956).  See also GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 183-90 (1968); LASSA OPPENHEIM, WAR AND NEUTRALITY, 237 (1921); COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, 
TERMINATION OF WAR AND TREATIES OF PEACE 210 (1916). 
183 See U.S. v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363 (C.M.A. 1970) (holding that civilian contractors accompanying 
armed forces are only covered by UCMJ in wars declared by Congress).  This loophole has subsequently 
been eliminated by Congress.  See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 
Pub. L. 109-364, § 552 (2006) (expanding UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians to include contingency 
operations through amendment to 10 U.S.C. §802(a)(10)).  Before this amendment, the only legal vehicle 
for contractor accountability was the more onerous route of prosecution in U.S. federal courts pursuant to 
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), Pub. Law. 106-523 (2000). 
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Power merely acts as a steward of the territory in place of the very sovereign against 
which it has been waging war.184  This tension between the roles of adversary and 
caretaker is captured perfectly by the provision of the Hague Regulations, discussed 
above, which requires the occupier to “take all the measures in his power to restore . . . 
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in 
the country.”185  The civilian population is caught in a similar dilemma, owing the 
Occupying Power obedience, but not loyalty.186 
 The law of occupation does not pretend that the local population has much say in 
these matters.  Instead, it first relies on self-regulation, assuming that occupying forces 
will fall under the jurisdiction of their own states.  And second, the responsibilities of 
Occupying Powers are primarily conceptualized as existing towards the entire community 
of states, arising from the obligation of all states to “ensure respect” for the Geneva 
                                                 
184 See Hague Regulations, supra note 130, art. 55 (“The occupying State shall be regarded only as 
administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to 
the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country.  It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and 
administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.”). 
185 Hague Regulations, supra note 130, art. 43.  See also id. art. 48 (“If, in the territory occupied, the 
occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do so, as far as is 
possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force . . .”); Fourth Geneva 
Convention, supra note 126, art. 64 (“The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with 
the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they 
constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.”). 
186 See Hague Regulations, supra note 130, arts. 44 (“A belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of 
territory occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about its means of 
defense.”); id., art. 45 (“It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to 
the Hostile Power.”).  See also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 126, art. 51 (prohibiting conscription 
of civilians in occupied territory). 
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Conventions “in all circumstances.”187  For this reason, the enforcement mechanisms 
envisioned by the Convention are largely decentralized and state-based.188 
 But the U.S. project in Iraq – not simply military control incident to war, but an 
attempt to build a new regime – has been far more ambitious than what the legal 
institution of belligerent occupation allows.  Thus, the CPA issued a number of decrees 
radically remaking the country’s legal, economic, and social institutions, with few if any 
attempts to argue that they were “absolutely” required.189  Some supporters of this effort 
have even argued that the situation should not be regulated by the law of occupation at 
all, but rather analyzed using the largely lapsed category of debellatio: total conquest 
leading to dissolution of the state’s international legal personality, as has been claimed 
regarding post-World War II Germany and Japan.190  Such “transformative occupations,” 
                                                 
187 Fourth Geneva Conventions, supra note 126, art. 1.  Obligations under international humanitarian law 
pertaining to occupation are arguably of an erga omnes nature – opposable to all states – as well.  See Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 
I.C.J. 136, 199 (July 9) (describing certain rules of international humanitarian law pertaining to occupation 
as existing erga omnes); but see 2004 I.C.J. 136 at 216-17 (Higgins, J., separate opinion) (calling erga 
omnes an “uncertain concept”). 
188 The Geneva Conventions envision two primary enforcement mechanisms: First, they provide for the 
appointment of certain neutral states as “Protecting Powers” with certain powers to monitor issues related 
to treatment of detainees and provision of aid – a mechanism that has rarely if ever been used.  See Fourth 
Geneva Convention, supra note 126, arts. 9, 11-12, 14, 23-24, 49, 52, 55, 59-61, 71-72, 74-76, 83, 96, 98, 
101-102, 104-105, 108-109, 111, 113, 123, 129, 131, 137, 143, 145.  Second, the Conventions establish 
individual criminal liability through the “grave breaches” regime, by requiring states to enact penal 
legislation for certain violations of the Conventions and to search for and prosecute (or transfer to 
prosecution) any individuals in their territory, regardless of nationality, who have committed such 
violations.  See id. arts. 146-147. 
189 See, e.g., Coalition Provisional Authority, Orders No. 37, Tax Strategy for 2003 (entered into force Sept. 
19, 2003) (rewriting Iraq’s tax code, including the institution of a 15% flat tax); No. 39, Foreign Investment 
¶ 3 (entered into force Dec. 20, 2003) (purporting to “replace[] all foreign investment law”); No. 74, 
Interim Law on Securities Markets (entered into force Apr. 19, 2004) (replacing Baghdad Stock Exchange 
with a new Iraq Stock Exchange and securities market system); No. 83, Amendment to the Copyright Law 
1 (entered into force May 1, 2004) (changing Iraqi copyright law to “meet[] internationally-recognized 
standards of protection, and to incorporate the modern standards of the World Trade Organization into Iraqi 
law”). 
190 See Melissa Patterson, Who’s Got the Title?  Or, Remnants of Debellatio in Post-Invasion Iraq, 47 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 2, 467 (2006).  For a contrary view, see Adam Roberts, Transformative Military 
Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 3, 580 (2006).  On UN 
Security Council resolutions as potential authorities for deviating from the law of occupation, see David 
Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 842 (2003). 
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however, require more than grudging obedience from the civilian population for the 
duration of the war; they demand genuine allegiance to a new order.  This ambition 
stretches the inherent tensions in occupation law to their limit: in order to establish their 
legitimacy, transformative occupiers must subordinate the population, but the more 
harshly they try to subordinate, the more they undermine their legitimacy.191  And if a 
transformative occupation is justified in the name of democracy, the problem of 
accountability produces contradictions that would not normally emerge in an occupation 
law context. 
 Thus, as the U.S. made “progress” towards creating a sovereign Iraqi state, the 
problem of impunity only became more glaring, forcing the logic of exemption to work 
itself out in increasingly convoluted ways.  The day before the U.S. purported to 
“transfer” sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government, the CPA made a number of 
amendments to CPA Order 17 designed to be binding upon its successors.  The only 
alteration to the immunity regime related to contractors.  In the original order, contractors 
enjoyed two layers of immunity: officially, they enjoyed immunity only for acts 
committed in the course of “their official activities pursuant to the terms and conditions” 
of their contracts.192  And for acts falling outside their official duties, they enjoyed de 
facto immunity from Iraqi law since no legal action against them for such acts could 
commence “without the written permission” of the head of the CPA.193  Under the 
amended order, the CPA’s silent veto of legal action against contractors for non-official 
acts was eliminated; but at the same time, contractors’ home governments were given the 
                                                 
191 See Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4, 721 (2005).  
192 CPA Order 17, §3 (2). 
193 Id. § 3(3). 
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ability to unilaterally classify their acts as “official.”194  In other words, the CPA 
amendments effectively replaced automatic immunity for contractors with giving their 
governments the option of exercising a veto over legal actions, shifting the burden only 
slightly against the logic of exemption. 
 As the stories of atrocities committed by U.S. forces and contractors in Iraq 
spread, it became increasingly difficult to reconcile the logic of exemption with the U.S. 
project of state-building.  This became more apparent in the uproar following the 
September 2007 shooting death of 17 Iraqi civilians in Nisoor square, Baghdad by 
Blackwater contractors working for the U.S. State Department.195  As the U.S. moved to 
create a longer-term basis for its military presence in Iraq, exemption had to be 
repackaged and renegotiated anew.  Thus the 2008 agreement on the status of U.S. forces 
ended blanket immunities, forcing the logic of exemption to be worked out through a 
number of practical and procedural obstacles to balance both states’ interests.  Most 
significantly, the agreement gives the Iraqi government primary jurisdiction over 
contractors196 – but only those working with the military.197  The legal status of other 
contractors, such as private security companies working with the State Department, 
remains unclear. 
                                                 
194  The new provision empowered states to certify, with conclusive legal effect “in any Iraqi legal 
process,” that their contractors were “act[ing] pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Contract.”  CPA 
Order 17 (revised), § 4(5) (entered into force June 27, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-
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Department and not military contractors) as well as a civil suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act.  See USA 
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196 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of 
United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence 
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197 See id. arts. 2(2), 2(5). 
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 With regard to U.S. forces and their civilian component, Iraq enjoys primary 
jurisdiction over “grave premeditated felonies” committed outside of military bases and 
“outside duty status.”198  A number of obstacles remain before such jurisdiction could be 
exercised, however.  First, the list of offenses covered and the procedures for asserting 
Iraqi jurisdiction remain to be determined by a Joint Committee composed of both 
parties; until agreement on these matters is reached, Iraq cannot exercise jurisdiction.199  
Second, the U.S. retains the power to block Iraqi legal process for specific acts by 
certifying that the alleged offenses arose during duty status.200  Third, Iraqi authorities 
can only hold U.S. personnel for 24 hours; even in cases where they exercise jurisdiction, 
custody shall reside with U.S. forces.201  No equivalent provisions exist in SOFAs 
between the U.S. and its NATO and major non-NATO allies.202 
 Thus, “progress” towards the U.S. goal of state-building in Iraq has forced the 
logic of exemption to take on increasingly complicated and uneasy legal forms.  When 
juxtaposed with the concomitant easing of the legal obstacles to the exclusion of out-of-
place Muslims described above, one can discern the essential features of the paradox of 
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202 Unlike the U.S.-Iraq agreement, SOFAs with NATO and other major U.S. allies do not allow the U.S. to 
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sovereign equality in a world of unequal power: Strong enough to authorize the exclusion 
of some outsiders but too weak to hold others accountable, Iraq seems well on its way to 
taking its rightful place alongside the other sovereign clients of the United States. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The structural logic of the American-led Global War on Terror is one that ultimately 
seeks to decide for other countries which outsiders should be outside the law and which 
should be above it.  As this conflict enters a new and what has been promised as a more 
enlightened stage, understanding its fundamental premises – as opposed to its Bushian 
excesses – is as crucial as ever to the twin tasks of critique and action.  This paper 
attempts to contribute to that process, in three ways: First, if there is to be a reckoning 
with the use of torture and unlawful detention over the past eight years, this paper 
suggests some of the areas – especially renditions from Iraq – where our knowledge is 
most lacking and where investigation is urgently required.  Second, in outlining a basic 
logic at work across diverse contexts and the assumptions that justify it, this analysis may 
provide clues to finding and analyzing similar regimes of exclusion and exemption 
elsewhere.  Third, these arguments help clarify some of the consequences of GWOT and 
the broader issues at stake. 
 The practices discussed in this paper – unlawful detention, deportation, and 
torture for some and impunity for others – are obviously deeply troubling for both the 
procedural as well as the substantive aspects of the rule of law, to say nothing of the fate 
of victims.  It is their juxtaposition, however, which raises the more complex questions: 
while discrimination between citizens is widely seen as violating a fundamental principle 
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of equality, differential treatment amongst non-citizens is not as obviously impermissible.  
Yet in certain extreme situations (such as those illustrated in this paper), it raises 
disturbing and important questions about who should decide on the distinctions between 
outsiders, and with which criteria.  Such questions cannot be resolved in any particular 
case, however, for two reasons that also arise from the logic of GWOT. 
 First, institutionally, outcomes concerning citizenship, nationality, and 
immigration in places such as Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be evaluated as 
ordinary sovereign decisions because of how the U.S. has subordinated these countries’ 
institutions to its own priorities.  In doing so, the U.S. has heightened the tension inherent 
in its approach to global power, which is premised on using the formal equality of 
sovereign states to mediate and legitimize a wide range of less than equal power 
relations. 
 Second, at a deeper level, evaluating the braided logic of exemption and exclusion 
requires a critique of its basic assumption, namely that the U.S. can decide on the 
differences between others because it occupies the position of the universal.  This stance 
effectively forecloses any serious comparative analysis between the actions of the U.S. 
and those of other outsiders.  Acknowledging this has nothing to do with moral relativism 
or “equivalency” with “terrorists”; it is simply a reminder that the views of others are an 
important part of the empirical world that must be properly understood.  The rhetoric of 
GWOT, with its repeated invocation of the need to win “hearts and minds,” appears to 
recognize this, in presenting people around the world with a choice between essentially 
competing offers of solidarity from the U.S. versus from those advancing pan-Islamist 
arguments.  It cannot be taken for granted that the former will always be preferable to an 
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ordinary Bosnian Muslim after a UN arms embargo that hampered self-defense against 
ethnic cleansing or an Iraqi after nearly two decades of sanctions, occupation, and civil 
war.  Foreignness, as well as the ability to embody the universal, is very much in the eye 
of the beholder. 
